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The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal
Thought: American Law and Economics
vs. German Doctrinalism
By KRISTOFFEL GRECHENIG * & MARTIN GELTER"
I. Introduction
Law and economics has become an integral part of U.S. legal
scholarship and the law school curriculum. Ever since the legal realist
movement, scholars mostly view the law from an external perspec-
tive.' It may be surprising to many in the United States that Euro-
pean legal scholarship has been largely resistant to this development.
Law is typically viewed "from the inside," that is as an autonomous
discipline independent from the other social sciences. Most legal
scholarship is doctrinal, meaning that legal scholars employ interpre-
tative methods in order to systematically expose the law and to find
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out what the law is, frequently even before it is tackled by a court.
U.S.-style legal scholarship is often considered very alien, and law and
economics in particular often meets outright rejection.
In this paper, we attempt to explain this divergence in the aca-
demic legal discourse using the reception of law and economics in le-
gal scholarship in German-speaking countries as a case in point.
However, we suspect that our approach can be generalized to other
parts of Europe because of common roots and similar historical fac-
tors that can be identified in many parts of Europe.
We propose a two-pronged explanation for why law and eco-
nomics play an insignificant role in German-speaking countries while
the United States has become a stronghold for it. First, in the United
States, legal realism (in its particular political setting) discredited
what has become known as classical legal thought. As a result, legal
academics in the United States were receptive of new approaches
which began to thrive later during the 20th century. In German-
speaking countries, the Free Law School had a similar agenda but did
not succeed in displacing doctrinal approaches. Consequently, there
was no void to be filled by external criteria. Second, since the 19th
century, utilitarianism had gained widespread acceptance in U.S. in-
tellectual circles. As it forms the foundation of modern welfare eco-
nomics, its basic tenets provide a fertile soil for the incipient law and
economics movement. In contrast, German philosophy promoted a
strictly anti-utilitarian attitude hostile to any law and economic
movement. To the extent external criteria were (or are) accepted by
legal scholarship they needed to be taken from a different source. It
has recently been pointed out that, both in the United States and in
Germany, legal theories opposed to positivism have prevailed. Other
than in the United States, the German critique resulted in a "value-
based", transcendental jurisprudence.2 In our view, none of these two
factors alone can explain the success of law and economics in the
United States relative to Europe, but the combination of the two can.
We proceed as follows: Section II describes the rejection of the
economic analysis of law in German-speaking countries and gives an
overview on explanations that we found in the existing literature.
Section III outlines our own hypothesis. Section IV traces the devel-
opment in the United States, based on the existing literature. It starts
2. Viktor Winkler, Review Essay - Some Realism about Rationalism: Eco-
nomic Analysis ofLawin Germany, 6 GERMAN L. J. 103, 1042 (2005).
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with the classical legal thought of the late 19th century and subse-
quently surveys legal realism and the early development of law and
economics since the 1960s. Section V describes the development of
legal theory in German-speaking countries. As both legal realism and
the Free Law School have pointed out, a doctrinal approach to law is
equally prone to exploitation to achieve certain political ends. The
current state of the discussion on legal philosophy is relevant to us in-
sofar as it influences the ordinary legal discourse, in particular the
predominant forms of legal scholarship. Section VI summarizes the
above discussion.
II. The Comparatively Weak Position of Law and
Economics in German-Speaking Countries
A. The Current State of Reception of U.S.-Style Economic
Analysis of Law
Typical continental European legal scholars often regard articles
published in U.S. law reviews as quite alien. What seems startling is
not so much the immersion of U.S. articles into the common law sys-
tem, but the interdisciplinary and, to the European observer, surpris-
ingly "non-legal" approach adopted by U.S. scholars. While Euro-
pean law scholars' work typically focuses on the interpretation of the
law and the attempt to smooth its inconsistencies by advancing the
understanding of its inherent structure and system, U.S. scholars
mostly view the law from an external perspective. Law and econom-
ics is the most important case in point, as it seems to dominate some
fields almost completely. An Italian scholar recently observed that
U.S. corporate law professors are not actually legal scholars, but
rather economists whose field of research is law.3
This purely functional approach distinguishes the US legal aca-
demia from scholarship in Europe, including the UK. Especially in
German-speaking countries, economic approaches to law have been
met with rejection quite frequently; law is not merely seen as a field
to be investigated with the methods of any branch of social science,
3. STEFANO LOMBARDO, REGULATORY COMPETITION IN COMPANY LAW IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 18 (2002).
4. But see Heikki Pihlajamaki, Against Metaphysics in Law: The Historical
Background of American and Scandinavian Legal Realism Compared, 52 AM. J.
COMp. L. 469 (2004) (discussing the notable exception of Scandinavia).
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but as a separate academic discipline and with particular "scientific"
methods.
German-speaking academia has brought forth treatises,5 articles6
and research institutes dedicated to the economic analysis of law.7
Still, predictions on the influence of law and economics made in the
early 1990s have not been confirmed: In 1991, Ugo Mattei and
Roberto Pardolesi suggested that the status of law and economics in
Europe merely lagged behind the United States by about 15 years.8
Assuming an approximately equal speed of development, one would
expect that the situation today should be comparable to the early
1990s in the United States. Today, it seems that Europe has not
caught up. Even though law and economics scholarship has clearly
increased in recent years, it continues to linger on the fringes of legal
scholarship.9 The number of law and economics papers is still
dwarfed by the amount published in the United States, and most of
the law and economics literature is ignored by legal discourse. Legal
scholars rarely develop their own economic arguments; where law
and economics is discussed, the primary objective is often to gain an
5. E.g. BERND SCHAFER & CLAUS OTT, LEHRBUCH DER OKONOMISCHEN
ANALYSE DES RECHTS 10-11 (3 "d ed. 2001); WOLFGANG WEIGEL, RECHTSOKONOMIK(2D ED. 2003); MICHAEL ADAMS,_OKONOMISCHE THEORIE DES RECHTS (2 "d ed. 2004);
JORGEN NOLL, RECHTSOKONOMIE - EINE ANWENDUNGSORIENTIERTE EINFUHRUNG(2005).
6. The German-speaking literature started to discuss the economic analysis of
law in the 1970s and early 1980s. See, e.g., PETER BEHRENS, DIE OKONOMISCHEN
GRUNDLAGEN DES RECHTS, note 10 (1986) (references to the early discussion).
7. E.g., the departments and centers of law and economics at the Universities of
Hamburg, Saarbricken, Vienna and St. Gallen.
8. Ugo Mattei & Roberto Pardolesi, Law and Economics in Civil Law Coun-
tries. A Comparative Approach, 11 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 265, 271-72 (1991) (iden-
tifying a lag of at least fifteen years, while at the same time suggesting that law and
economics might develop more quickly in Europe because of the different system of
appointing judges). See UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 89, 91
(1997) (one coauthor maintaining this position a few years later); see also generally
Gdrard Hertig, The European Community, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 331 (1991).
See also Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought. 1850-1968,
36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 674-78 (2003) (identifying a globalization of contempo-
rary legal discourse independent of law and economics).
9. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen L. Brun, Lost in Translation: The Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law in the United States and Europe, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 602, 620 (2006); Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innova-
tion: Law and Economics in Europe and the United States 12-19 (I11. Law & Econ.
Working Papers Series, Research Paper No. LE07-009, 2006) (providing evidence
from journal articles).
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understanding of U.S. legal thought rather than the specific applica-
tion of economic arguments to legal issues." Admittedly, critiques of
the law and economics perspective abound in the United States.
However such criticism opposes a powerful intellectual movement in
the United States. Similar critiques in German-speaking literature
are more or less directed against a seedling that has not yet been able
to grow firm roots. Mainstream scholars have pointed out that, while
economic analysis emphasizes efficiency criteria and aims to create an
optimal allocation of resources under minimal transaction costs, these
factors cannot be of primary importance, as the legal system also
needs to take non-monetary values into account." Most critics em-
phasize that efficiency neglects the distribution of goods and income,
which leads to an aggravation of existing inequalities. 12 It is argued
that replacing the obligations of legal ethics with utility calculus under
the homo economicus assumption discriminates against the poor,
thereby failing to meet the goals of social justice.3 In addition to that,
economic analysis has a reputation of employing utopian models
which cannot be applied to practical issues.'4 Moreover, opponents of
economic analysis point out that social science is generally unable to
deliver precise results, meaning that any claims about economic con-
sequences of legal rules are purely speculative. 5
10. Garoupa & Ulen, id. at 2.
11. E.g., Jochen Taupitz, Okonomische Analyse und Haftungsrecht - Eine
Zwischenbilanz, 196 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAYIS 114, 133 (1996); HELMUT
KozIOL & RUDOLF WELSER, 1 GRUNDRISS DES BORGERLICHEN RECHTS 20-21 (12th
ed., 2002). See, e.g., Hans-Peter Schwintowski, Okonomische Theorie des Rechts, 53
JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 581, 587 passim (1998) (discussing this misconception). See also
BERND SCHILCHER, THEORIE DER SOZIALEN SCHADENSVERTEILUNG (1977) (arguing
that the "capitalist principle of distribution" (marktwirtschaftliche Verteilungspin-
zip) contradicts the "social principle" (Sozialprinzip).
12. E.g., Karl-Heinz Fezer, Aspekte einer Rechtskitik an der economic analysis
of law und am property ights approach, 41 JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 817, 823-24 (1986);
Taupitz, supra note 11, at 124 (suggesting that aspects of social distribution of re-
sources are per se outside the scope of economic analysis).
13. Taupitz, id. at 133.
14. Fezer, supra note 12, at 822-23; see also Friedrich RUffler, Glgubigerschutz
durch Mindestkapital und Kapitalerhaltung in der GmbH - uberholtes oder sinn-
volles Konzept, 4 GESELLSCHAFrS- UND STEUERRECHT AKTUELL 144 (2005) (out-
right rejection of economic analysis); see generally Fritz Rittner, Das Modell des
homo oeconomicus und die Jurisprudenz, 60 JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 668 (2005).
15. This argument was already made in the late 19th century. See Izhak
Englard, Victor Mataja's Liability for Damages from an Economic Viewpoint: A
Centennial to an Ignored Economic Analysis of Tort, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 173,
185 (1990). It was again brought up by HANS KELSEN, WAS IST GERECHTIGKEIT? 23-
20081
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In many cases these criticisms can be traced to a restricted under-
standing of economics among traditional legal scholars, who are
rarely familiar with its analytical instruments, such as the role of
models16 or the meaning of non-monetary values.' On one hand, cer-
tain approaches to law and economics, especially the one attached to
the Chicago School, 8 offer a welcome target for attacks and a basis
for outright rejection of any economic approach to law, sometimes
without profound analysis and discussion.' 9
52 (1953, Reprint 2005). Compare Horst Eidenmiuller, Der homo occonomicus und
das Schuldrecht: Herausforderungen durch Behavorial Law and Economics, 60
JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 216 (2005) and Rittner, supra note 14; Horst Eidenmiuller,
Schlusswort, 60 JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 670, 671 (2005), for the controversy between Ei-
denmuiller and Rittner about the merits of behavioral law and economics.
16. See, e.g., Fezer, supra note 12, at 820 (pointing out the absence of transaction
cost in the Coase Theorem); but see Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J. L. & ECON. 1, 15-19 (1960) (analyzing markets in the presence of transaction cost).
17. Occasionally, it has been pointed out even in the German-language legal lit-
erature that non-monetary values are not a priori exclused from economic analysis.
See, e.g., Schwintowski, supra note 11, at 587-88. See also Frank Adloff, Theorien
des Gebens - Nutzenmaximierung, Altruismus und Reziprozitat, in NONPROFIT-
ORGANISATIONEN IN RECHT, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 139 passim (Klaus J.
Hopt, Thomas von Hippel & W. Rainer Walz eds., 2005); Ludwig von Auer, Oko-
nomische Theorieansatze des Gebens, in NONPROFIT-ORGANISATIONEN IN RECHT,
WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 159 passim (Klaus J. Hopt, Thomas von Hippel &
W. Rainer Walz eds., 2005) (controversy on the non-monatary preferences in eco-
nomics in general).
18. The most prominent one is probably Richard Posner's wealth maximization
approach. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, andLegal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Utilitarianism]; see generally Richard
A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOrSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). Posner seems to have retreated from
this position. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethics of Wealth Maximization, 36 U.
KAN. L. REV. 261, 265 (1988) [hereinafter Posner, Ethics]; Richard A. Posner, The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1670 n.62 (1998)
[hereinafter Posner, Problematics]; Francesco Parisi, Methodological Debates in Law
and Economics" The Changing Contours of a Discipline, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW
AND ECONOMics 33, 47-48 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005) [here-
inafter Parisi, Changing Contours]; Charles K. Rowley, An Intellectual History of
Law and Economics.- 1739-2003, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMIcS 3, 21-22
(Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005).
19. Prominent German-language treatises on legal methods typically mention
only Richard Posner as a representative of American law and economics and make
no references to other approaches: see HANS-MARTIN PAWLOWSKI,
METHODENLEHRE FOR JURISTEN n.852, 855 (2d ed. 1991), FRANZ BYDLINSKI,
JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE UND RECHTSBEGRIFF 331 (2d ed. 1991); Otto Palandt,
Birgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] 2003, 62nd ed., Einleitung , n.32
(F.R.G.). The criticism of some other authors also seems to rest address the Chicago
School approach only, e.g., ERNST A. KRAMER, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE 236
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Since the early days of modern law and economics, wealth
maximization has been criticized as an approach that does not corre-
spond to the welfare economics goal of maximizing total social wel-
fare, i.e. the maximization of total utility within a society.0 It has
been pointed out that if people place a negative value on the unequal
distribution of wealth, the maximization of total utility has to include
distribution considerations' as part of its normative objective. How-
ever, alternative approaches and refinements of the initial theories
are still often ignored.
Altogether, law and economics still have to overcome significant
obstacles in German-speaking countries. Sometimes, economic
analyses are considered acceptable as long as their applicability is re-
stricted to legislation and thus excluded from the scope of a lawyer's
or legal scholar's daily work.22 Where it is accepted as an element of
interpretation, mostly as a type of purposive interpretation of the
(2nd ed. 2005) (citing primarily an article published by Eric Posner in 2003); KOzIOL
& WELSER, supra note 11, at 20-21; see also KLAUS MATHIS, EFFIZIENZ STATT
GERECHTIGKEIT (2003) (discussing primarily Posner, but also mentioning other au-
thors). A more comprehensive treatment is given by HORST EIDENMOLLER,
EFFIZIENZ ALS RECHTSPRINZIP (1995) (allowing law and economics in legal policy,
but permitting it as a guideline to interpretation only where efficiency has been made
the policy of a statute), BEHRENS, supra note 6, and ANNE VAN AAKEN, RATIONAL-
CHOICE IN DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT. ZUM STELLENWERT DER OKONOMISCHEN
THEORIE IM RECHT (2003). On controversial assumption of law and economics, see
infra Section 0.
20. See GUIDO CALABRESi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 24 (1970); Guido
Calabresi, About Law and Economics: a Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 553 (1980); Guido Calabresi, The New Economics Analysis of Law. Scholar-
ship, Sophistry, or Self-indulgence?, 68 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 85, 89 (1982); Louis
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VS. WELFARE (2002); Parisi, Changing Con-
tours, supra note 18, at 44-48 (summarizing).
21. See Calabresi, The New Economics Analysis of Law, id at 93-94, 97-100 For
a comprehensive discussion see KAPLOW & SHAVELL, id. at 28. Legal economists
typically argue that redistribution should not be attempted in substantive legal rules,
but left to tax law. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is
Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
667 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?
Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000). Distributive justice was taken into account by utilitarian-
ism as early as in the work of Jeremy Bentham. See, e.g., PAUL J. KELLY,
UTILITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE CIVIL
LAW 14 passim (1990).
22. See generally EIDENMOLLER, supra note 19; see generally Taupitz, supra
note 11.
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law,' it remains strictly subordinate to the traditional canons of inter-
pretation. 2
i. A Short Overview of the Existing Literature
1. Divergence Between Common Law and Civil Law
So far, most explanations of this divergence have emphasized in-
stitutional factors. Ugo Mattei and Roberto Pardolesi have suggested
that a central reason for the divergence is the decentralized decision-
making system and the more powerful position of the judge in the
Anglo-Saxon common law, as opposed to the stereotype of the conti-
nental civil law judge as a mere interpreter of the law." A related ar-
23. See, e.g., BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, at 331; KRAMER, supra note 19, at 236-
37; Dieter Krimphove, Rechtstheoretische Aspekte der "Neuen okonomischen
Theorie des Rechts," 32 RECHTSTHEORIE 530 (2001); Reinhard Kohl, Ober die
Rechtsan wendung im Sinne der Okonomischen Analyse des Rechts im Verhaltnis zu
den hergebrachten Kanons der Gesetzesauslegung, in JAHRBUCH JUNGER
ZIVILRECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLER 1992, 29-46 (Stephan Breidenbach et al. eds., 1993).
24. See the discussion in standard works on interpretation such as PAWLOWSKI,
supra note 19, at notes 852, 855 (2d ed. 1991); KRAMER, supra note 19, at 236-7; F.
BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, at 331-32. Law and economics is not even discussed by
KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (6th ed. 1991) and
REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE (4th ed. 1985); see also stan-
dard treatises on civil law such as PALANDT, supra note 19, at Einleitung notes 32-3;
KOZIOL & WELSER, supra note 11, at 20-21; see also Taupitz, supra note 11, at 135-36;
EIDENMOLLER, supra note 19, at 450 passir, Horst Eidenmtiller, Rechtsanwendung,
Gesetzgebung und okonomische Analyse, 197 ARCHIV FUR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS
80 passim (1997) and the particularly critical assessment of Fezer, supra note 12, at
817 et seq. For a descriptive accounting of this rejection see Christian Kirchner, The
difficult reception of law and economies in Germany, 11 INT"L REV. L. & ECON.
277-8 (1991); Taupitz, id. at 128 passim.; Victor Winkler, Okonomische Analyse des
Rechts im 19. Jahrhundert: Victor Matajas "Recht des Schadensersatzes' revisited,
26 ZEITSCHRIVr FOR NEUERE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 262 (2004); Wolfgang Weigel, Law
and Economics in Austria, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS Nr. 0305 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000), at
<http://encyclo.findlaw.com/tablebib.html>; G6rard Hertig, Switzerland, 11 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 293 passim. (1991). For further references to jurisprudence and
doctrinal legal scholarship, see SCHAFER & OTrr, supra note 5, at 10-11. For a discus-
sion of efficiency as a principle of constitutional law, see Konrad Lachmayer, Ef-
fizienz als Verfassungsprinzip: Fine Maxime fur staatliches Handeln in Osterreich9 ,
in 44 ASSISTENTENTAGUNG, RECHT UND OKONOMIK 135 passim (Marc Bungenberg,
Stefan Danz & Helge Heinrich eds., 2004).
25. Mattei & Pardolesi, supra note 8, at 267; MATTEI, supra note 8, at 81-82. See
generally Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics in Common-Law, Civil-Law, and
Developing Nations, 17 RATIO JURIS 66, 76-77 (2004) (contrasting common law and
civil law); Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Law and Economics Movement in
[Vol. 31:1
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gument was brought forward by Christian Kirchner in the German
context. He stresses the predominant understanding of the constitu-
tional separation of powers, under which judges are allowed only to
interpret the law on the basis of existing statutes and are prohibited
from making reference to non-legal arguments.
6
Although these points are absolutely valid, they do not suffice as
a sole explanation. English legal scholarship provides a counter-
example, as it is generally considered to be committed to an "inter-
nal" perspective on the law." Admittedly, law and economics have
made some inroads in the U.K., notably in corporate law,' but as a
whole, scholarly work based upon black-letter law continues to pre-
dominate as it does on the European continent. External or critical
perspectives seem to remain marginal as they do in continental
Europe. 29 Thus, if one were to observe an increased openness of Brit-
ish scholarship to U.S. approaches to law, one can well put down any
edge over the continent to the shared English language and a greater
U.S. influence resulting from it.
2. The Success and Failure of Legal Positivism
Closely related to the argument outlined in the previous section
is the theory that legal positivism, understood as strict adherence to
positive law to the exclusion of any substantive justification of norms,
caused legal scholarship to dissociate from other disciplines.' This is
true, for example, for Hans Kelsen's widely known approach to legal
positivism, which has gained widespread acceptance in civil law coun-
tries.
Even though the legal positivism argument has some merits, it
cannot provide an exclusive explanation for the widespread rejection
Europe, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3 (1997).
26. Kirchner, supra note 24, at 277-92. See also Posner, Future, id. at 5; Dau-
Schmidt & Brun, supra note 9, at 607, 617; Taupitz, supra note 11, at 129 passim. See
generally HERGET, supra note 1, at 115-16 (discussing separation of powers in gen-
eral).
27. Brian R. Cheffins, Using Theory to Study Law. A Company Law Perspec-
tive, 58 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 197, 200-01 (1999); see also Neil Duxbury, When Trying is
Failing- Holmes's "Englishness" 63 BROOK. L. J. 145, 146 (1997); HERGET, supra
note 1, at 106.
28. Cheffins, id. at 208-09.
29. See Duxbury, supra note 27, at 148.
30. E.g., Wolfgang Weigel, Prospects for Law and Economics in CivilLaw Coun-
tries: Austria, 11 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 325, 326 (1991).
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of law and economics. After all, economic efficiency could have been
implemented by statutory law (e.g., as a method of interpretation), or
at least been used (without an explicit statutory basis) as an element
of the generally accepted legal principle." Furthermore, legal positiv-
ists such as Jeremy Bentham can be counted among the precursors of
the modern law and economics movement.32 This issue aside, it has
frequently been pointed out both in the United States (most promi-
nently by the legal realists) and in German-language literature
(mostly by the free-law school) that personal views of judges inevita-
bly enter judgments, meaning that a clear separation between mere
interpretation and the creation of new law is impossible.33 We will ar-
gue that legal positivism played an important role in the evolution of
legal thought. However, we emphasize the role of policy in Kelsen's
theory.'
3. Legal Education and Career
Some authors have sought to explain the rejection of law and
economics by pointing to the particularities of legal education in
Germany. The most frequent culprit is the lack of training in eco-
nomics among lawyers. 35 The alleged dislike of mathematics preva-
lent among jurists adds to this factor.3 6 By contrast, U.S. students
normally have to undergo a more general non-legal education in col-
31. Mattei & Pardolesi, supra note 8, at 269 (emphasizing the role of case law
also in civil law countries).
32. See infra Section VI.
33. On the German free-law school, see infra section 0. On hermeutics in gen-
eral see HANS-GEORG GADAMER, WAHRHEIT UND METHODE: GRUNDZUGE EINER
PHILOSOPHISCHEN HERMENEUTIK (6 h ed. 1990); on hermeneutics in German legal
literature see e.g., JOSEF ESSER, VORVERSTANDNIS UND METHODENWAHL IN DER
RECHTSFINDUNG (1972). The indeterminacy of jurisprudence on the basis of pre-
existing materials such as statutes or precedents is also the fundamental thesis of
American legal realism [see e.g., Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE
BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50 (Martin A.
Golding & William P. Edmundson eds., 2005)] and of the critical legal studies move-
ment [for an overview, see Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Theory, in THE
BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 80 (Martin A.
Golding & William P. Edmundson eds., 2005); seminal works are e.g., Duncan Ken-
nedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997)].
34. See infra pages 344 and following.
35. Weigel, supra note 30, at 326.
36. R. Cooter & J. Gordley, Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries. Past,
Present, Future, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 261-63 (1991).
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lege before entering law school, which may also result in greater
openness towards interdisciplinary approaches to law. Another fac-
tor is the conservative approach to appointing professors prevalent in
most European countries.38
The role of legal education may play a role in explaining the di-
vergence. However, until recently, jurists in German-speaking coun-
tries had to take courses in economics; 9 additionally, U.S. law profes-
sors often lack formal training in mathematics, ° which does not
necessarily prevent them from bringing forward economic arguments.
In any case, it is probably necessary to ask whether the design of the
current curricula is a consequence, rather than the cause, of the mar-
ginal importance of economics for legal interpretation and policy.
The same is true of argument attributing the rejection of law and eco-
nomics to misconceptions, such as its exclusive identification with the
Chicago School.4
4. Rent-Seeking and Academic Incentives
The argument has been made that rent-seeking activities by tra-
ditionally trained jurists constitute a strong interest group in opposi-
tion to any progressive legal movements. In the Austrian context,
37. Cf Dau-Schmidt & Brun, supra note 9, at 618-19.
38. MArEI, supra note 8, at 88. See also the contributions to the symposium on
"Selecting Minds", 41 AM. J. CoMP. L. 351-53 (1993).
39. Leaving aside the old tradition of "Faculties of Legal and State Sciences"
(rechts- und staatswissenschaftliche Fakultaten" (infra section 0), mandatory courses
in economics and business management were only abolished in Austrian law faculties
a few years ago. See also Eugen BOhm-Bawerk, Book Review of Victor Mataja, Das
Recht des Schadenersatzes vorn Standpunkt der Nationalokonomie, 17 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR DAS PRIVAT- UND OFFENTLICHE RECHT DER GEGENWART (GRONHUTS
ZEITSCHRIFT) 418 (1890) (pointing out that few people are able to be experts both in
law and economics).
40. See Cooter & Gordley, supra note 36, at 262.
41. Weigel, supra note 24, at 120; also see Christian Watrin, Nutzen und Kosten
des Rechts, in EFFIZIENZ DER GESETZESPRODUKTION 239, 242 (Wolfgang Mantl ed.,
1995).
42. Cf MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT VII § 8, 509 passim (5th
ed. 1976); CC von Weizsackerin a letter dated June 6, 1993, to Horst Eidenmuiller,
cited by EIDENMULLER, supra note 19, at 7; ct Rittner, supra note 14, at 669 (reject-
ing behavioral law and economics (among other arguments) because it threatens to
subvert the independence of law). See generally 1 Dieter Grimm, Methode als
Machtfaktor, in EUROPAISCHES RECHTSDENKEN IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART -
FESTSCHRIFT FOR HELMUT COING 469 passim (Norbert Horn et al. eds., 1982) (dis-
cussing the instrumental use of methodology in general); NIKLAs LUHMANN,
OFFENTLICHE ENTSCHADIGUNG RECHTSPOLITISCH BETRACHTET 189, 192 (1965) (dis-
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Wolfgang Weigel points out the predominant position of lawyers in
the economy.43 Other than in the U.S, where decisions about the ac-
ceptance or rejection of an article in law reviews are made by stu-
dents, in Europe the decision is typically made by established law pro-
fessors. While students do not normally have a particular position to
defend, an established professor may sometimes be opposed to the
publication of an article strongly opposed to his own approach. In
this sense, the U.S. system of law reviews is more open to new ap-
proaches, as it is necessary to promote a new and controversial thesis
in order to have an article accepted by a reputable law review; natu-
rally, this is a much better invitation to papers critical of the status
44quo.
Arguments aiming at the protection of vested interests may ex-
plain why the predominant type of legal thought has maintained and
expanded its potion, but they do not explain how it originally came
into being. One possibility would be to seek the answer in the eco-
nomic system in general. For example, some authors have pointed to
the generally established practice of seeking to achieve widespread
consensus in politics. 45 This may relate to the long-standing hegem-
ony of Keynesian macroeconomics among economists in Europe.46 In
any case, Germany and other European countries lacked an anti-
intervention sociopolitical movement (as it existed in the U.S.) in the
vicinity of which the law and economics movement could thrive. 7
Economic and social policy must therefore have to be part of the ex-
planation.
In a recent article, Oren Gazal-Ayal has attempted to explain the
prevalence of law and economics in the United States with the publi-
cation incentives of legal academics: While in the United States, and
even more so in Israel, standards for appointment and promotion
create rewards for law and economics publications, this is not the case
in Europe. 8 Similarly, Nuno Garoupa and Thomas Ulen have re-
cussing the political weight of consensus in legal methodology).
43. Weigel, supra note 30, at 326; see also Hertig, supra note 24, at 293 (making a
similar argument for Switzerland).
44. See Dau-Schmidt & Brun, supra note 9, at 615.
45. Weigel, supra note 30, at 327 (for Austria); Hertig, supra note 24, at 300 (for
Switzerland).
46. MATTEI, supra note 8, at 92; cL Weigel id
47. Taupitz, supra note 11, at 128-29.
48. Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic Analysis of Law and Economics, at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=901164.
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cently suggested that the U.S. edge in law and economics and in "le-
gal innovations" can be explained with how legal scholarship is evalu-
ated in the U.S. 9 The claim is that there is a strong incentive to inno-
vate where multiple law schools compete for faculty members and
students, and where successful schools are better able to place their
students in the job market. They emphasize a variety of institutional
factors to explain why legal academia in European countries has a
stronger conservative bias, including the organization of the legal pro-
fession, the judiciary, and academia. Admittedly, this may be an im-
portant contributing factor. However, there are probably two impor-
tant weaknesses in the argument.
First, Garoupa and Ulen themselves point out that legal innova-
tions generally increase the gap between scholarship and practice. °
This casts doubt on the idea that the content and innovation in schol-
arship is strongly influenced by the student job market. Second, the
theory does not explain why the gap between legal scholarship in the
United States and Europe is so much greater in law than in any other
field. Finally, even though Gazal-Ayal's and Gaorupa and Ulen's
theories are plausible, they do not explain how different incentives
came into being. After all, there is considerable path dependency in-
fluencing how research is evaluated in a given field, over which estab-
lished legal scholars have considerable influence.
III. Overview of Our Own Hypothesis
In this section we attempt to trace the acceptance and rejection
of law and economics to the evolution of legal theory, in its specific
political and social context. Legal scholarship in German-speaking
countries and the United States developed in a parallel fashion up to
the interwar period, but then began to diverge. While in the United
States, classical legal thought was discredited by legal realism, its
German cognate, the Free Law School, failed to have the same effect.
Instead of discrediting Begriffsjurisprudenz (conceptual jurispru-
dence), the counterpart to U.S. classical legal thought, it was replaced
by Interessenjurisprudenz (interest jurisprudence) and its outgrowth,
Wertungsjurisprudenz (jurisprudence of value judgments), both of
which resemble conceptual jurisprudence in important elements. All
these schools bear a strong moment of reproductive argumentation,
49. Garoupa & Ulen, supra note 9.
50. Id at41.
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from which novel and external elements, such as the efficiency of a
certain interpretation, are excluded.
The position of policy (Gesetzgebungslehre)5' in legal scholarship
is one of the core elements of our explanation. In German-speaking
countries, policy typically stands outside the realm of legal scholar-
ship and is left to politics. This tradition can be traced back to the
first half of the 1 9 th century, namely to Savigny's historical school ofjurisprudence. It was carried into the 2 0 1h century by Interessenjuris-
prudenz and restated in Hans Kelsen's theory of legal positivism that
completely eliminated policy from the "science of law," amplifying
the acceptance of an internal perspective that already dominated
German legal academia.
By deconstructing classical legal thought in the United States, le-
gal realism created a vacuum in legal scholarship and jurisprudence
that was to be filled by a discussion on policy. In the decades that fol-
lowed, the law and economics movement could take up reconstructive
work in order to develop new principles and decision criteria. In do-
ing so, it achieved a hegemony vis-t-vis other movements. 3 This vac-
uum was never created in German-speaking countries in the first
place. For this reason, among others, it is not surprising that the early
law and economics movement that developed in the late 19th century
in Austria failed.
The fact that in the United States the legal realism movement
succeeded, while in German-speaking countries the free law move-
ment failed, can partly be explained by political factors, most impor-
tantly the role of U.S. judicial review. The opposition between con-
servative judges, who used formalistic reasoning to strike down
progressive social legislation, and progressive legal scholars fostered
legal realism as this opposition gave academics the means to attack
the courts. As a result, a pluralism of methods characterizes U.S. le-
gal scholarship today, but it can be said that consequentialist ap-
proaches are dominant. Among other approaches to the law, such as
51. In German, the terms Rechtspolitik and Gesetzgebungslehre can be used in-
terchangeably. See MANFRED REHBINDER, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE, note 8 (4th ed.
2000).
52. Cf Cheffins, supra note 27, at 198-200 (defining "external" and "internal"
perspectives in legal scholarship).
53. Cf Thomas Ulen, The Unexpected Guest; Law and Economics Law and
Other Cognate Disciplines, and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 79 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 403,414-15 (2004).
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critical legal studies and, law and society, it seems that law and eco-
nomics has become dominant. This was due to a background ideol-
ogy of utilitarianism, which served as a basis for law and economics
and which has gained widespread influence in the United States since
the 19th century. In contrast, German philosophy followed a strictly
anti-utilitarian path that can be traced back to German idealism (e.g.,
Kant). It is likely that even if policy had become an integral part of
legal scholarship, law and economics would not have been the domi-
nant approach.
IV. The U.S. Experience: Legal Realism and Utilitarianism
A. American Legal Realism as Background to Law and
Economics
Contemporary economic analysis of law54 was developed in the
United States, where it has become a predominant method of legal
scholarship. Typically, this is explained by means of the development
of legal theory in the United States during the first half of the 20th
century. Up to this time, U.S. and German lawyers shared a similar
methodological outlook. The decisive reason why U.S. scholarship
turned its back on doctrinalism can be traced to political develop-
ments during that period.
During the late 19th and early 20th century U.S. legal scholarship
was characterized by what is today called classical legal thought.55
This approach, which is often identified with the name of Christopher
Columbus Langdell, paralleled German Begriffsjurisprudenz in many
important aspects,56 without any decisive difference resulting from
U.S. law's focus on case law as opposed to the German civil law sys-
54. For a historical analysis, see HEATH PEARSON, THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMISTS' NEW SCIENCE OF LAW 43, 131 (1997); Ejan Mackaay,
History of Law and Economics, in 200 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 68 passim (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (both
discussing early precursors of law and economics).
55. E.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 1870-1960, 9 (1992); see generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL
OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1998); Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern
Legal Thought." From Langdell and Holmes to Posner and Schiag, 28 IND. L. REV.
353 (1995) (using a different historical classification).
56. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 8, at 637-48 (identifying a globalization of clas-
sical legal thought originating in Germany).
2008]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
tern. Classical legal thought understood law as "legal science."57 Ac-
cording to Langdell, general principles should be derived from cases,
identifying the features of a coherent system. From these principles,
it would be possible to deduce solutions for specific (future) cases.8
Cases that did not fit into the system should be eliminated as errone-
ous. 9 This resulted in the kind of formalism Roscoe Pound was to
criticize as "mechanical jurisprudence. ' 6° Neil Duxbury has described
the typical law review article of this time as "dry, technical, doctrinal,
and often narrowly focused.,
61
The development both in law teaching and legal scholarship was
influenced by German legal scholarship during the classical period
which, at that time, consisted largely of the "historical school" estab-
lished by Savigny.62 From the German tradition, Langdellian legal
57. See generally, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 346 (1993).
58. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 496-97
(1988).
59. Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGALTHEORY 261, 275-76 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2003) (1999).
60. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
See also HORWITZ, supra note 55, at 16-17; Singer, supra note 58, at 496-544;
NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW. FROM
POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 7-9 (1997); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in
Modern American Law: A View from Century's End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 10-79
(1999) (all discussing the doctrinalism of the classical period).
61. Neil Duxbury, When Trying is Failing: Holmes's 'Englishness" 63 BROOK. L.
J. 145, 156 (1997). The example he gives is Loran L.Lewis, Jr., The Law of Icy Side-
walks in New York State, 6 YALE L. J. 258 (1897).
62. See generally FRANZ WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT
UNTER BESONDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN ENTWICKLUNG 381 (2nd
ed. 1967); JOHN DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 451-50 (1968); Stefan
Riesenfeld, The Influence of German Legal Theory on American Law: The Heritage
of Sa vigny and His Disciples, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1989); Michael H. Hoeflich, Savi-
gny and his Anglo-American Disciples, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 17 (1989); Mathias Re-
imann, The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and the Defeat
of the New York Civil Code, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 95 (1989); Mathias Reimann, Nine-
teenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 837 (1990); Kennedy, supra
note 8, at 637-62; Laura I. Appleman, The Rise of the Modem American Law
School. How Professionalization, German Scholarship, and Legal Reform Shaped
Our System of Legal Education, 39 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 251, 274-306 (2005); see
also RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 193 passim (2001); for a
contemporary view, see Joseph H. Beale, The Development of Jurisprudence During
the Past Century, 18 HARV. L. REV. 271, 283 (1905); with respect to legal education
and the Langdell reforms see David S. Clark, Tracing the Roots of American Legal
Education - A Nineteenth-Century German Connection, 51 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 313, 328 (1987) (pointing
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scholarship also adopted the understanding of law as a science,63 de-
siring to cleanse law of the influences of other disciplines. '
Central to classical orthodoxy was an understanding of private
law as separate from public law and as politically neutral.6 Under
that view, the state should likewise remain neutral in conflicts of in-
terest between interest groups and avoid engaging in redistribution of
wealth.66 In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence was
committed to an economic liberalism, which, resulted in an increasing
amount of opposition within a rapidly changing society.67
Of course, the most important precursor to legal realism was
Oliver Wendell Holmes, first as professor at Harvard Law School,
later as judge at the Supreme Court of Massachusetts and finally, as a
United States Supreme Court Justice. His seminal article, "The Path
of the Law," 8 published in 1897, criticized the predominant mode of
legal thought, according to which the common law developed by ap-
plying an objective set of methods to previous cases and abstract
principles. 69 He was the first to come up with the prediction theory,
according to which lawyers should attempt to predict the court's deci-
sion when advising clients.7" With a view to law and economics, one
might even recognize the homo economicus within his writings: "If
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
out similarities between Savigny's and Langdell's teachings); Appleman, id. at 283-
306.
63. Appleman, id. at 280-306.
64. Appleman, id. at 289-306. Cf HERGET, supra note 1, at 113 (discussing the
points of intersection between the Langdellian tradition and German conceptual ju-
risprudence).
65. HORWITZ, supra note 55, at 10-11.
66. Id. at 19-20.
67. See infra pp. 13-15.
68. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457 (1897).
69. Holmes, id. at 465-66. Cf his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905): "General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision
will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major prem-
ise." See also Brian Tamanaha, The Realism of the 'Formalist' Age, ST. JOHN'S
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER No. 06-0073 (August 2007), available at
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=985083> (arguing that legal realist thoughts were part of
the legal discourse before Holmes and that the legal realists of the 1920s and 30s only
marked the last episode in a long lasting critique on legal reasoning).
FormularbeginnFormularende
70. See generally Holmes, supra note 68
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knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the
vaguer sanctions of conscience."7'
Holmes famously criticized the logical-historical 2 perspective
classical legal thought applied to law and the doctrinal deductions
that resulted from it. He emphasized that the study of law should fo-
cus on the social objectives it is intended to achieve.73 A judge with
an understanding of both historical and current social goals should be
better able to contribute to the understanding and development of
the law.74 At least upon first glance, this view would allow the judge's
discretion to blur the distinction between doctrinal deductions and le-
gal policy, as cases cannot be objectively decided on the basis of
precedents and preexisting, coherent common law, whereas in reality
the judge's individual social value judgments inevitably influence his
decisions.75
As a result of his tenure as a United States Supreme Court Jus-
tice, Holmes became an idol of a generation of lawyers. Possibly, his
most notable dissent was the one in Lochner v. New York,76 in which
the majority denied the constitutionality of a New York state law lim-
iting the daily working hours of bakers. Holmes famously objected
that "[a] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism [...] or of laissez faire." During the
Lochner era, which lasted until 1937, the court decided numerous
cases on similar grounds and declared a large body of progressive so-
cial legislation as unconstitutional on the basis of formalistic deduc-
tions from general principles, most of all the principle of the freedom
71. Holmes, id at 459.
72. But see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW: LECTURE 1 1-38
(Dover Publications 1991) (1881) (pointing out that a historical perspective is impor-
tant in general). However, HORWITZ, supra note 55, at 109, 141 suggests that
Holmes' views developed between the publication of 'The Common Law" (1881)
and "The Path of the Law" (1897) towards more a more pronounced skepticism.
73. Holmes, supra note 68, at 474. See also Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic In-
strumentalism and American Legal Theory, 13 RECHTSTHEORIE 257, 258 (1982).
74. See, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes, Langdell and Formalism, 15 RATIO
JURIS 26, 44-45 (2002).
75. Cf Holmes, supra note 68, at 471-72 ("But when I stated my view to a very
eminent English judge the other day, he said: 'You are discussing what the law ought
to be; as the law is, you must show a right!').
76. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908). See e.g., Rowley, supra note, at 10
(discussing the opinion in the context of the development of law and economics).
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of contract. This approach was criticized by a growing number of
lawyers and legal academics. 7' Holmes, who remained a member of
the Court until 1932, was a precursor of legal realism through his dis-
sents. Holmes did not necessarily share the radical rejection of classi-
cal legal thought as is common among many legal realists; rather, his
own approach was one of judicial restraint.79
Besides Holmes, there were other authors, even before World
War I, who rejected the classical orthodoxy, namely progressives such
as Roscoe Pound 8° or Benjamin Cardozo.81 While some later observ-
ers such as Robert Summers have preferred to group these towering
figures into one movement,' Karl Llewellyn, who would shape the
outside and self-perception of legal realism for decades, actually at-
tempted to distance himself and the younger generation of legal real-
ists from their forebears.83
77. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (unconstitutionality of a stat-
ute banning the enforcement of covenants prohibiting workers from joining unions);
Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (unconstitutionality of a statute limiting
the working hours of pregnant women). For an overview, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1346-81 (3d ed. 2000); but cf RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 284 (1995).
78. But see ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY & SANFORD LEVINSON, THE AMERICAN
SUPREME COURT 92 (4th ed. 2005) (generally approving of the court's approach)
79. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 57, at 381; NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 44 (1995).
80. Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG
607 (1907); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence. 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908);
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books andLa win Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
81. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
Cardozo became a New York state judge in 1914 and succeeded Holmes as a U.S.
Supreme Court Justice in 1932.
82. Robert H. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century
American Legal Thought - A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General The-
oryAbout Law and its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1981) (pointing out the promi-
nence of the progressive movement in US politics between 1890 and 1920 at 869);
Summers, supra note 73, at 263-64 (describing them as pragmatic instrumentalists);
see also Wetlaufer, supra note 60, at 16 passim, cf Posner, supra note 77, at 2.
83. HORWITZ, supra note 55, at 170 (describing the Llewellyn-Pound controversy
and arguing that Llewellyn's famous list of legal realists conveyed a distorted picture
of the movement); DUXBURY, supra note 79, at 72-160. For the Llewellyn-Pound
controversy, see Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - the Next Step, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realistic Jurisprudence,
44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism -
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931) (establishing the list of
realists at 1226, note 18); contra Viktor Winkler, The Great Protector. Roscoe
Pound (1870-1964) zum 40. Todestag, 24 DAJV-NEWSLETrER 104 (2004) (emphasiz-
ing differences between Roscoe Pound and the legal realists, most of all in their out-
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The legal realism of the 1920s and 1930s should be viewed before
the backdrop of opposition to the laissez-faire jurisprudence of the
Lochner era, to which an increasing portion of law scholars objected.
Under the influence of the criticism of conceptual jurisprudence
brought forth earlier by Jhering in Germany' and by the Free Law
School,85 the legal realists borrowed from Holmes the credo of law as
experience" and began to deny the importance of "law in books" (as
opposed to "law in practice").' Law was not to be understood as a
system of rules, but only as the body of judicial decisions. They re-
jected the idea that law could be an autochthonous, judgment-free
science, which allowed one to reach predetermined solutions for all
possible cases through objective methods (such as analogies) within a
closed logical system.89 At the same time, they rejected any concep-
tual jurisprudence which attempted to arrive at concrete solution
starting with abstract propositions.
Realism's core tenet, the indeterminacy theory of law,9 is often
understood in light of the realists' opposition to the philosophy of
laissez-faire market capitalism. To realists, market principles seemed
to be hiding behind the formalist deductions of pre-realist jurispru-
dence and, in the realist view, served to conceal the inherently politi-
cal character of judicial decision-making by providing a formal justifi-
look on economic policy). For a contemporary criticism of Pound, see also Jerome
Frank, Are Judges Human ?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 18-24 (1931).
84. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) (referring to Jhering).
85. See HORWITZ, supra note 55, at 172 (discussing German influences on Karl
Llewellyn); see generally James Q. Whitman, Commercial Law and the American
Volk: A Note on Llewellyn 's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97
YALE L. J. 156 (1987) (discussing Llewellyn and the UCC); James E. Herget &
Stephan Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Le-
gal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399 (1987).
86. "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." Oliver W.
Holmes, Jr., Book Notice, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880); HOLMES, supra note 72, at
1.
87. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 761
(1932). This pair of opposite terms can be traced to Roscoe Pound. See generally
Pound, supra note 80. Jerome Frank criticized that "classical" law scholars continued
to study the law in books only. Id. at 20.
88. See e.g. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 60, at 10.
89. John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELLL. Q. 17 (1924) (criticiz-
ing the application of logic to legal reasoning); see HORWITZ, supra note 55, at 188.
90. Cohen, supra note 84, at 809. See HORWITZ, supra note 55, at 199 passim.
91. Leiter, supra note 33, at 51 passim.
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cation.92 In this view, court decisions are not determined by an objec-
tive application of pre-determined legal materials, but are traced
largely to the value judgment of the judges who shape abstract rules
and holdings in accordance to their views,93 restrained only by the ne-
cessity to provide reasoning in the form of a judicial opinion.94
Robert Hale's criticism of classical economic policy and the alleged
distributive neutrality of free markets is a case in point,9 as is the real-
ists' rejection of the distinction between public and private law.'
Although the various approaches, methods and projects of legal
realists can hardly be described as unitary, and as the most extreme
ideas did not gain widespread recognition,' legal realism succeeded in
leaving a permanent impression on U.S. legal scholarship.98 At the
political level, legal realism succeeded in its mission when President
Roosevelt's New Deal reforms were waived through by the Supreme
Court following a judge's change of mind (making the President's
threat to pack the court with additional judges redundant).'
This overview illustrates how U.S. development was unique, also
in comparison to the U.K. H. L. A. Hart, the renowned British legal
positivist, attributes the critical approach to law predominant in the
92. Singer, supra note 58, at 477.
93. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 58, at 465, 469-70.
94. Singer, supra note 58, at 471-72; see Llewellyn, Realism, supra note 83, at
1239 (emphasizing that the issue is how far the supposed certainty provided by legal
rules actually goes). Today, it appears to be widely recognized that judges are con-
strained actors, see, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 33, at 182 passilr, but cf Frank, supra
note 87, at 645, 761, 766-84.
95. Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); see also Robert Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943). See BARBARA FRIED, THE
PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND
ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998).
96. E.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933);
see also Louis Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937);
see Singer, supra note 58, at 483 passin, Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Main-
stream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 13, 33-48. (David Kairys ed., 1998).
97. For example, Jerome Frank attempted to trace the outcome of legal cases to
judges' personalities. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Cf
Summers, supra note 73, at 264; Singer, supra note 58, at 470; HORWITZ, supra note
55, at 176.
98. See Leiter, supra note 33, at 54.
99. The decisive case was West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
See TRIBE, supra note 77, at 1360; see MCCLOSKEY & LEVINSON, supra note 78, at
108-13, 117-20.
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United States to judicial review of laws for their constitutionality" °
and the compliance with basic rights enshrined in the United States.
Constitution." ' Hart argues that the United States Constitution
"made law what elsewhere would be politics."1°2 He suggests that
U.S. legal theory is torn between extreme perspectives of indetermi-
nacy and free judicial decision-making on one side and the contrary
desire to be able to find a specific, correct solution for every hard
case, even if it is difficult to identify (a view today most prominently
represented by Ronald Dworkin), on the other.03 This particular po-
litical dynamic is absent in U.K. jurisprudence, as were other factors
such as federalism and the potential for conflict associated with it.' °'
Duncan Kennedy mentions another factor comparing the United
States to Europe and the U.K., namely the greater social heterogene-
ity of U.S. lawyers that led to stark ideological contrasts, which in
turn nourished the desire to fundamentally criticize the law.05 Ap-
parently, U.S. law schools were sufficiently well-developed to allow
this sort of criticism to flourish, which English law faculties appar-
ently were not.'°6.
Although legal realism lost its vitality,0 U.S. legal scholarship
never returned to the classical jurisprudence legal realism had dis-
100. In Hart's view, the origins of the American development can be traced to
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), the case in which the Supreme Court first es-
tablished judicial review.
101. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare
and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 971-72 (1977).
102. Id. at 972.
103. Id.; Dworkin famously argues that the correct outcome of a "hard case" can
be found by a judge with superhuman analytical qualities ("Hercules") by extracting
it from the basic principles of the legal system and a political theory explaining it.
See generally Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
104. KENNEDY, supra note 33, at 78-9.
105. KENNEDY id. at 79-80.
106. In From 1938-19/39, there were only 1,515 law students in all of the UK, 60%
of which studied at Oxford and Cambridge. An academic degree was not even re-
quired to enter the bar for a long time. See Neil Duxbury, English Jurisprudence be-
tween Austin andHart, 91 VA. L. REV. 1, 70-71, 79 (2005).
107. The 1950s were dominated by the legal process school, which focused on the
decision-making process (instead of the substantive content) and on which institu-
tions were in the best position to address which issues. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra
note 55, at 253 passinm, Singer, supra note 58, at 505-06. The most fundamental work
is HENRY M. HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (teaching materials of 1958, posthumously pub-
lished in 1994).
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credited.'" One of the legacies of legal realism was its demand that all
policymakers, including judges, should take social sciences, including
economics, into account when making judgments."
The U.S. law and economics movement is at times seen as heir to
legal realism and the fulfillment of the Holmesian prophecy of lawyer
as social scientist."" Some legal realists also broadened their gaze to
sociology, psychology and economics."' One of the most well-known
examples is the seminal 1932 book "The Modern Corporation and
Private Property" by law scholar Adolf A. Berle and economist Gar-
diner Means,"2 which to this day is considered one of the most impor-
tant contributions to the discussion on conflicts of interest between
shareholders and managers in publicly traded companies. Other stud-
ies had considerable influence on legislation, for example in the 1938
bankruptcy codification. 3
The characterization of law and economics as the progeny of le-
gal realism is by no means undisputed. As other 20th century move-
ments of U.S. legal scholarship (which include the legal process
108. The consequentialist approach dominant in US legal scholarship was also
impervious to H.L.A. Hart's criticism of legal realism. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF THE LAW 137(1961). See also Leiter, supra note 33, at 63-64; Michael Steven
Green, LegalRealism as Theory ofLaw, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917 (2005).
109. See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 457 (1924); Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook
Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L. J. 468, 481 (1928); Llewellyn, A Real-
istic Jurisprudence, supra note 83; Edward S. Robinson, Law - an unscientific Sci-
ence, 44 YALE L. J. 235, 257 (1934); cf Summers, supra note 58, at 870, 889 passimr,
Summers, supra note 73, at 260; Gary Minda, The Law and Economics and Critical
Legal Studies Movements in American Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 87, 96 (Nicho-
las Mercuro ed., 1989); DUXBURY, supra note 79, at 79-160.
110. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The law and economics movement: from Ben-
tham to Becker, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 328, 344-45 (Francesco
Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005); but see POSNER, supra note 77, at 3;
DUXBURY, supra note 79, at 301-420. Cf Wetlaufer, supra note 60, at 37; Anthony T.
Kronman, Jurisprudential Reponses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 339
(1988).
111. See Kronman, id. at 336-40 (discussing the "scientific branch" of realism).
For example, some incipiencies of an economic analysis of contract law can be found
in Karl Llewellyn's work. See Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Early Law and
Economics of Contract, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 421 (Peter Newman ed., 2002).
112. See HORWITZ, supra note 55, at 166 (considering the book a legal realist
work).
113. See DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT'S DOMINION 109 passim (2001) (discussing the
legislative history of the 1938 Chandler Act in the preceding SEC report).
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school, rights theory, law and society and, critical legal studies move-
ments), the law and economics paradigm is to be seen both as a reac-
tion and a continuation of realism; most schools share the realist re-
jection of logical and scientific jurisprudence and embrace a
conseqentialist orientation towards conflicts of interest within soci-
ety."'1 Economic analysis of law can be considered a descendent of le-
gal realism, as logical deductions from within the legal system are
considered normatively undesirable. 15 Admittedly, normative theo-
ries (as instruments of legal policy) maintained a subordinate position
in legal realism.'1 6 However, legal realism made inevitable the renun-
ciation of pure doctrinalism as the lawyer's exclusive tool, ultimately
requiring the development of a normative program in order to sup-
plement and replace the indeterminacy of interpretation.1
As it became widely recognized that the orthodox doctrinal
method in fact allowed for a variety of interpretations, other meas-
ures needed to be developed in order to guide judicial decision-
making. These measures had to be geared to external, non-legal ele-
ments, leading to the emphasis on policy. Adherents of legal realism
and its successor movements were slow to develop normative bench-
marks on the basis of descriptive insights in order to assimilate them
into the legal discourse. However, finally, normative benchmarks
came to dominate, which is why legal policy takes the central role in
American law schools.
Legal realism is based on a utilitarian understanding of the law,
bent on a realization of specific social goals. This contributed to law-
yers' open discussion of the policy implications of judicial decision-
making. 8 Although several decades past between the heyday of legal
realism and the spread of economic analysis of law in academia, a
clear thread connecting the two movements can be identified. Law
114. See e.g., Singer, supra note 58, at 503-04 (distinguishing between liberal and
critical movements).
115. See Singer, supra note 58, at 516-57; Wetlaufer, supra note 60, at 37 (describ-
ing law and economics as a direct descendant of legal realism).
116. Leiter, supra note 59, at 276-77 (speaking of "quietism").
117. See Harold D. Lasswell & Myers S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203, 205 (1943)
(calling for a change of the curriculum in legal education in order to teach legal pol-
icy); cf Mensch, supra note 96, at 36.
118. Leiter, supra note 59, at 59-60. Contrary to Ulen & Garoupa, supra note 9,
at 8, we believe that the normative side of law and economics was the more impor-
tant one.
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and economics is based on the instruments of economics which allow
for prognoses of the consequences of legal norms that can, and should
be, subject to empirical scrutiny. Through this, and some recommen-
dations about economically efficient proposals made by lawyer-
economists, economic analyses of law apparently struck the right note
with American legal scholarship so fundamentally transformed by re-
alism. Thus, in spite of widespread criticism of law and economics,
the movement managed to fill a gap torn open by legal realism, re-
placing the discredited legal formalism with an economic approach
that permits, what is considered by many, scientific results."9
B. The Utilitarian Basis of Law and Economics
Legal realism alone does not suffice to explain the important po-
sition of the economic analysis of law in the U.S. legal academia.
Other normative research programs sharing an instrumental and con-
sequentialist outlook with law and economics also managed to ad-
vance into the gap torn open by legal realism. These include the law
and society and the critical legal studies movements. However, the
particular significance of law and economics and its widespread ac-
ceptance can be explained with a certain longstanding U.S. tradition.
The ideas of utilitarianism can be traced back to Jeremy Ben-
tham, who criticized Sir William Blackstone, the eminent English ju-
rist, in his works on legal policy.' While Blackstone taught positive
law, 2' Bentham was a reformer.' He intended to discredit traditional
119. See Singer, supra note 58, at 522 passim (considering law and economics an
"exercise in formalism"); see also Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law:
Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 459 (1974); Gary Minda, The
Lawyer-Economist at Chicago. Richard A. Posner and the Economic Analysis of
Law, 39 OHIO ST. L. J. 439, 441 (1978); Erich Schanze, Okonomische Analyse des
Rechts in den USA: Verbindungslinien zur realistischen Tradition, in OKONOMISCHE
ANALYSE DES RECHTS 1, 6-7 (Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Christian Kirchner & Erich
Schanze eds., 2d ed. 1993); Dau-Schmidt & Brun, supra note 9, at 615-16; see
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 362 (1990) (arguing that
economic formalism was prferable to legal formalism, as it can be empirically scruti-
nized).
120. We will not go into the debate of to what extent Bentham intended to pro-
mote his own moral concepts. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Blackstone and Ben-
tham, 19 J.L. & ECON. 569, 593, 596 (1976).
121. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND (1765-1769), available at < http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone>.
122. ELIE HALEVY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM 35 (1928). Ben-
tham himself criticized Blackstone for his anti-reformist views. See JEREMY
BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT OF GOVERNMENT, Preface (1776), available at
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dogmas"' and became particularly known for his aversion to theologi-
cal and metaphysical bodies of thought."' In his work, he built on Ce-
sare Beccaria and later found ardent proponents of his ideas in James
Mill and his son John Stuart Mill."5 Bentham defined a legislative ob-
jective and attempted to have it prevail in politics. His behavioral
model was clearly hedonistic: "Nature has placed mankind under the
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure."'26  Once
"utility" had been determined on this basis, it was the legislator's job
to maximize it: "... the happiness of the individuals, of whom a com-
munity is composed... is the end and the sole end which the legisla-
tor ought to have in view."'27
Although little attention was given to him in the 19th century,
John Austin's work was influenced by Bentham.'2 s However, Austin's
work resulted in a widespread echo outside his native country and, by
way of Spain, also reached Latin America. However, he hardly suc-
ceeded in France and Germany. 9 In the United States, he was in
contact with various politicians.1 "° Bentham's "greatest happiness"
principle was recognized even by some of the founding fathers such as
Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin as a goal of legal policy,
and also taken up and developed further by American philosophers.''
It is not surprising that he was cited by courts, including the United
<http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/benthami/govemment.htm>. Bentham particularly criti-
cized Blackstone's confusion of is and ought, e.g. GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1986) 305. But see Posner, supra note 120, at 569 (giving
a somewhat different interpretation of Bentham's critique of Blackstone).
123. Bentham believed that the Common Law tradition was pathologically op-
posed to reform; POSTEMA, supra note 122, at 311-12.
124. HALtVY supra note 122, at 292-515; KEEKOK LEE, THE LEGAL-RATIONAL
STATE 140 passim (1990).
125. For further details, see HALtVY, id. In certain fields, Mill's impact was
greater than Bentham's. See, e.g., HALtVY, id. at 271; KELLY, supra note 21, at 5-6.
126. JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCrION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 14 (Batoche Books 2000) (1781), available at <http://www.efm.
bris.ac.uk/het/bentham/morals.pdf>; see also KELLY, id. at 14 passim (discussing psy-
chological hedonism in Bentham's work).
127. BENTHAM, id at 27.
128. Duxbury, supra note 106, at 39; see also DUXBURY, supra note 79, at 54-64
(discussing the marginal influence of American legal realism on English legal scholar-
ship).
129. HALtVY, supra note 122, at 296-97.
130. PETER KING, UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICA 71 (1986).
131. KING, id at 139-484, 142. Even Bentham though that this principle was al-
ready the driving force of US legislation. Id at 62.
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States Supreme Court, quite a number of times.
Bentham's significance increased until the U.S. Civil War, more
so in the North than in the South. Among others, Chief Justice Taney
of the U.S. Supreme Court declared in an 1837 opinion that, "the ob-
ject and end of all government is to promote the happiness and pros-
perity of the community by which it is established.' ' 33 At the same
time, newspaper editorials cited with approval Bentham's ideas.'4
Starting with judges such as Lord Mansfield, it slowly came to be rec-
ognized that courts were permitted to deviate from the common law if
utility required them to do so. Among other things, the reason given
for this was the idea that the common law should be subject to a con-
stant utilitarian transformation.3 3 Bentham's opponents tended to
criticize his lack of originality rather than his ideas about legal pol-
icy.36 Some opposed his views for religious reasons, which is per-
spicuous as utilitarianism was seen as a means of banning theology
from philosophy.' All in all, the significant influence of Bentham's
ideas on the U.S. public can be identified as early as the first half of
the 19th century.
In parts, his works influenced legal realism, however primarily in
the analysis of consequences of legal norms and not as a policy pro-
gram.' The influence of utility maximization in neoclassical welfare
economics was much stronger, as it served as a normative objective
and as a basis for further developments of utilitarianism.3 9 It was also
132. A LexisNexis search for "Bentham" yielded 624 hits, among those 46 US Su-
preme Court opinions. At least seven of them mention the maximum happiness
principles. (The search was restricted to opinions in which the words "Bentham" and
"happiness" were found within twenty words. The courts typically use the term
"greatest happiness principle.") The search was last repeated November 28, 2005.
133. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 547 (1837).
134. E.g., Editorial, BOSTON MORNING POST, May 16, 1840; NEW YORK EVENING
POST, June 11, 1840. Even the conservative North American Review praised Ben-
tham for attacking old prejudice; also as cited by KING, supra note 130, at 252 passim.
135. Mensch, supra note 96, at 27. Note that Bentham himself rejected the Com-
mon Law approach, developing a positivist theory of the law.
136. KING, supra note 130, at 218, 234-35.
137. King, id. at 240-42 (referring to John Neil).
138. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 84, at 848 ("Since the brilliant achievements of
Bentham, descriptive legal science has made almost no progress in determining the
consequences of legal rules.")
139. ALFRED BOHNEN & GREHARD WEISSER, DIE UTILITARISTISCHE ETHIK ALS
GRUNDLAGE DER MODERNEN WOHLFAHRTSOKONOMIE (1964).
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an important building block of the economic analysis of law. ' ° Wil-
liam Stanley Jevons, one of the fathers of the theory of marginal util-
ity and follower of Bentham, argued that, "utility must be considered
as measured by... the addition to a person's happiness... [i]t is a
convenient name for the aggregate of the favorable balance of feeling
produced less the sum of the pleasure created and the pain pre-
vented.
,
'
41
While Jevons believed that there could be no common denomi-
nator for mere sentiment,' 2 this could not stop him from engaging in
interpersonal comparisons of utilities and aggregating them.' 3 Ben-
tham believed that happiness was homogeneous, independent from
individuals and, could be compared and measured on a cardinal
scale.'" The idea of cardinal measurement of utility maintained its in-
fluence from the works of Bentham down to Arthur Cecil Pigou' 5 and
continued to ordinal comparisons of utility'4 6 which characterized the
law and economics movement.' 47  The most decisive factor was the
140. See, e.g., Charles K. Rowley, Wealth Maximization in Normative Law and
Economics A Social Choice Analysis, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 971, 981-84 (1998), cf
Lewis A. Kornhauser, A guide to the perplexed claims of efficiency in the law, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 598 (1980); Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Or-
dinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LIT. 511 (1984). Among
others, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, who with Henry Sidgwick was one of the most im-
portant utilitarians of that time and one of the fathers of early welfare economics,
used the criterion of "just noticeable differences" to measure utility and thus kept up
the utilitarian tradition; Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists
Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LIT. 511 (1984).
141. William Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy, at 53-54 (Macmil-
lan ed. 1911) (1871).
142. Id. at 111.
143. See Rowley, supra note 140, at 971, 981.
144. E.g, Rowley, id. at 978-79 (discussing this in the context of law and econom-
ics).
145. ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920); cf Rowley, id.
at 978-79, 982.
146. The renunciation of cardinal measurement of utility and interpersonal com-
parisons of utility is often attributed to Vilfredo Pareto. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 93-94 (1947); specifically, see VILFREDO
PARETO, MANUALE DI ECONOMIA POLITICA (1906) (particularly chapters III §§ 12,
16, 29 and chapter II § 34 and following, discussing utilitarianism). Neoclassical con-
sumer theory was developed on the assumption of individual ordinal preferences.
SAMUELSON, id. at 97-98, 173, 226. See also Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions
and Inter-personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); J. R. Hicks, The
Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECoN. J. 696 (1939). For a historical over-
view, see Cooter & Rappoport, supra note 140, at 507.
147. On the discussion about Pareto efficiency and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, see
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conviction that estimates about individual utility are a better ap-
proach than any alternative, which is shared between utilitarianism
and the economic analysis of law.' 48 In many cases, the practical im-
plementation of this idea meant that utility had to be transformed
into monetary value, which is often done in modern law and econom-
ics and also can be traced back to Bentham.' 9
In any case, Bentham created a normative objective for econom-
ics and thus, at the same time, allowed it to become the subject of le-
gal theory.' At times, early law and economics works referred to
Bentham directly. For example, Bentham's "Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation" became the basis of the eco-
nomic analysis of criminal law developed by the later Nobel laureate
Gary Becker in his seminal article on "Crime and Punishment". '
Richard Posner, one of the pioneers of the economic analysis of law,
concedes that Bentham's utilitarianism exerted a decisive influence,"'
although Posner distinguishes his own normative approach to law and
economics from utilitarianism.'53
infra notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Rowley, supra note 140, at 981-84.
149. Jeremy Bentham, The Philosophy of Economic Science, in JEREMY
BENTHAM'S ECONOMIC WRITINGS 117 (W. Stark ed., 1952) ("Money is the instru-
ment of measuring the quantity of pain or pleasure. Those who are not satisfied with
the accuracy of this instrument must find some other that shall be more accurate, or
bid adieu to politics and morals"); see LEE, supra note 124, at 119; KELLY, supra note
21, at 33-34.
150. Richard A. Posner, Bentham's Influence on the Law and Economics Move-
ment, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 425, 437 (1998). See also Rowley, supra note 18, at
8; and cf Wilfred Harrison, Introduction to J Bentham, in JEREMY BENTHAM, A
FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT IX (1988) (pointing out the novelty of the approach of
using legislation as a means to put utilitatianism into practice). But see JOSEPH
PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (1768) (an early
work with a similar approach); also, e.g., HALtVY, supra note 122, at 127-78; P.J.
KELLY, UTILITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE
CIVIL LAW (1990).
151. Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968). See Posner, supra note 120, at 600 (discussing Bentham's influ-
ence on Becker's work); see generally Posner, supra note 150, at 430, 437 ("Bentham
can be considered, along with Smith, who was, however more ambivalent about the
ethical significance of economics, the founder of normative economics.")
152. Id.
153. E.g., Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 18, at 103; Posner, supra note 120, at
425. See Parisi, Changing Contours, supra note 18, at 46-47 (summarizing, but using
a very narrow definition of utilitarianism). Precisely this attempt to distance himself
drew a lot of criticism to Posner, in particular his attempt to supplant utility maximi-
zation with wealth maximization. See, e.g., Calabresi, The New Economics Analysis
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Similar to Bentham, Posner assumes that individuals are rational
utility-maximizers, and that economic efficiency is a scientific con-
cept.1 4  Posner permits interpersonal comparisons of utility, uses
wealth as a cardinal measure for utility, and starts off with the maxi-
mization of total utility as the core of utilitarianism. "5 In general, the
method of aggregating all types of utility to one unit"' is not only the
core of utilitarianism, but also of economic cost-benefit analysis.'57
Likewise, the other pillars of utilitarianism, i.e., consequentialism (ac-
cording to which human actions should be judged by their conse-
quences), and the principle of universal maximization of happiness or
utility (i.e., the idea that the fulfillment of human desires according to
individual preferences is desirable as such) formed the basis of eco-
nomic analysis of law."8  Rowley describes "welfarism," "sum-
ranking" and "consequentialism" as characteristics of utilitarianism,
which influenced the theory of marginal utility and welfare econom-
ics, in which law and economics originates.'59 Most likely, the devel-
opment of the law and economics movement was facilitated by the
fact that influential critiques of utilitarianism had not yet been written
in its early years,' 6° and that the U.S. academic community felt largely
appreciative of it.'6' Even (U.S.) critics of utilitarianism did not dis-
tance themselves all too clearly from some of its fundamental ten-
ofLaw, supra note 20, at 90; see also MATHIS, supra note 19, at 187.
154. Rowley, supra note 140, at 990 (referring to RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981)).
155. See also Rowley, supra note 140, at 992.
156. BERNHARD GESANG, EINE VERTEIDIGUNG DES UTILITARISMUS 19 (2003).
157. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 140, at 598.
158. A useful overview of these terms is provided by GESANG, supra note 156, at
17.
159. Rowley, supra note 140, at 981 passin, see also Kornhauser, supra note 140,
at 591, 598-99 (discussing the close links between utilitarianism and the law and eco-
nomics objective of maximizing total utility).
160. E.g,, AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1974); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). Of
course, some known earlier critiques had been written. LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY
ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (1932).
161. See Calabresi, The New Economics Analysis of Law, supra note 20, at 104.
See also John Broome, Modern Utilitarianism, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 651, 656 (Peter Newman ed., 2002); cf
Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 239 (1998) (speculating that Ameri-
can society may be more open to law and economics efficiency analysis than others,
as unequal distribution may more easily result in destructive political instability else-
where).
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As a preliminary result, we can identify two crucial reasons why
economics was easily implemented into American legal scholarship:
First, utilitarianism had gained considerable significance in American
society and also influenced the modern law and economics move-
ment. Second, the specific political context during the first half of the
20th century led to the rise of legal realism, which discredited classical
legal thought and thus created a vacuum in legal scholarship that
could be filled by new ideas. Today, most American law scholars
seem to share an instrumental understanding of law: Law is seen a
means to achieve specific goals instead of value in itself.63 Much
more than elsewhere, this allowed new movements, and most of all
law and economics, to flourish.
B. Origins and Developments of the Modern Law and
Economics Movement
Economists had taken an interest in the law long before the de-
velopment of the modern economic analysis of law.' 64 At the same
time, legal scholars have attempted to gain a better understanding of
the law by studying economics.165 However, law and economics as a
tool open to a larger group of legal scholars developed only during
the 1960s and was initiated mostly by the works of Ronald Coase and
Guido Calabresi, who are typically described as the founding fathers
of the law and economics movement. ' The ground had been pre-
pared during the 1940s and 1950s at the University of Chicago, which
was to become the intellectual home of the economic analysis of law,
much as Harvard had stood for the Langdellian tradition and Yale
and Columbia had for legal realism. 67 Aaron Director, the second
162. Rawls' concept of justice was at times interpreted as utilitarian, to which, of
course, Rawls objected. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS (2001).
163. Summers, supra note 58, at 861 passim, Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great
Image ofAuthority, 36 STAN. L. REV. 349, 361 (1984).
164. For early examples in Austria, see VICTOR MATAJA, DAS RECHT DES
SCHADENERSATZES VOM STANDPUNKT DER NATIONALOKONOMIE (1888); FRIEDRICH
KLEINWACHTER, DIE KARTELLE - EIN BETRAG ZUR FRAGE DER ORGANISATION DER
VOLKSWIRTHSCHAFT (1883).
165. See Mackaay, supra note 54, at 70-71 (discussing the decline of the 19th cen-
tury law and economics movement).
166. See also Schanze, supra note 119, at 2 passim.
167. DUXBURY, supra note 79, at 331. Charles K. Rowley, Law and Economics
from the Perspective of Economics, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
2008]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
economist to be appointed to the University of Chicago Law School
in 1946,68 began to exert a great influence both at the department of
economics and the law school. His teaching abilities allowed him ex-
ert considerable influence on both his students and other faculty
members. 169 He was the original editor of the Journal of Law and
Economics, in which Ronald Coase was to publish his seminal article
on "The Problem of Social Cost" in 1960,17 which finally triggered the
application of economic analysis beyond business law fields such as
antitrust, corporate and tax law, and thus started off the law and eco-
nomics movement.
Coase's article provides 'powerful criism of Arthur Pigou'7' and the
Pigovian idea of internalizing external costs by imposing damage
payments on the party responsible to achieve a reduction in the eco-
nomically efficient amount. By pointing out the effects of incentive
on the purported victims of externalities, Coase demonstrated the re-
ciprocity of the relation between tortfeaser and victim. As a result,
what is now known as the Coase Theorem, and "Coasian bargaining"
more generally, lent its conception of economics to a wide variety of
legal problems. Another important precursor, the 1992 Nobel laure-
ate Gary Becker, taught mostly at the University of Chicago as well
(albeit not at the law school). He is often credited with first having
applied economic methods to situations that are not normally consid-
ered to be governed by markets, such as crime, racial discrimination '72
or family life173.174 He is known for his work on rational and irrational
behavior, on human capital 17 and, his pioneering work on crime andpunishment1 77 where he first applied an economic analysis that can be
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 478 (Peter Newman ed., 2002).
168. DUXBURY, supra note 79, at 342; Mackaay, supra note 54, at 72.
169. DUXBURY, supra note 79, at 342 -420; James J. Heckman, The Intellectual
Roots of the Law and Economics Movement, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 327, 331 (1997).
170. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
171. ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
172. GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957).
173. GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981).
174. Cf Mackaay, supra note 54, at 73.
175. Gary Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON.
1 (1962) (arguing that irrational acters will, in the long run, be eliminated from the
market or forced to act rationally). GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).
176. GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1975).
177. Becker, supra note 151.
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found in almost every law and economics textbook today.178
On the basis of these bodies of work, economics was first able to
achieve results interesting to lawyers working in some core fields of
law, such as contract law, tort law, and criminal law, including fields
not thought to be governed by markets. This scholarship also allowed
greater depth in application of legal practice and scholarship to fields
that had been discussed by economists for some time, such as indus-
trial economics.
179
However, the decisive factor for the significance of the economic
analysis of law today was the application of economic principles not
only by economists, but most of all by legal scholars themselves. Dur-
ing the 1960s and 70s, Guido Calabresi began to study tort law from
an economic perspective independently from Coase, publishing a se-
ries of articles1" and a book on the costs of accidents. 8 ' Another im-
portant precursor of the law and economics movement in legal aca-
demia was Henry Manne, whose main fields were corporate and
securities law, in which he became chiefly known as a proponent of
anti-interventionist views8 2 and as a critic of the prohibition of insider
trading.183 In 1976, Manne established a two-week intensive course on
178. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 215 passim
(6th ed. 2003); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND ECONOMICS
79 passim (3d ed. 2003).
179. Cf Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:
1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 765, 767 (1987).
180. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts.
70 YALE L. J. 499 (1961); Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Ap-
proach to Non-Fault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); Guido
Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules: A Comment,
11 J. L. & ECON. 67 (1968); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamad, Property
Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability.- One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089 (1972); Guido Calabresi & Jon Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liabil-
ity in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055 (1972); Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and
Accidents, 84 YALE L. J. 656 (1975); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the
Law of Torts, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975).
181. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
182. Henry Manne, The Higher Criticism of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM.
L. REV. 399 (1962); Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,
73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Henry Manne, Our Two Corporate Systems.: Law and
Economics, 54 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967).
183. Henry Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. REV.
113 (1966); HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); see
generally DUXBURY, supra note 79, at 359. See Henry Manne, Howlaw and econom-
ics was marketed in a hostile world a very personal history, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 309 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005) (vividly de-
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microeconomics for judges.'8' Although this program was often criti-
cized as being biased in favor of the Chicago School and as sponsored
by large corporations,' 5 about a third of federal judges had partici-
pated in it by 1983'86, 40% by 1990.'8' Two further steps in the estab-
lishment of law and economics as a scholarly field were taken by
Richard Posner, who founded the Journal of Legal Studies in 1972, a
journal which focuses on law and economics, but is mostly read and
stocked with articles by members of law faculties.' 8 His monograph
on the "Economic Analysis of Law," first published in 1973,'89 was the
first standard textbook of law and economics. After more then
forty years, the economic analysis of law has become an established
element of America legal culture.' 9' This stature of the law and eco-
nomics movement is also accepted by its critics."
It may be true that the Chicago School has already penetrated
those fields readily open to this approach.' 93 However, other types of
economic analysis have since evolved, which also have been able to
influence legal thought in the United States.
D. American Legal Scholarship and Law and Economics Today
The very idea of a "legal science" was discredited by legal real-
scribing early resistance to law and economics).
184. See Henry N. Butler, The Manne Program in Economics for Federal Judges,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 351 (1999).
185. See DUXBURY, supra note 79, at 359-60; George L. Priest, Henry Manne and
the Market Measure of Intellectual Influence, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325, 330
(1999) (discussing the program's curriculum).
186. DUXBURY, supra note 79, at 360.
187. Butler, supra note 184, at 352. See generally Bruce A. Green, Judicial Inde-
pendence: May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs? Should Ju-
dicial Education be Privatized?" Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 941, 941-42, 954 (2002).
188. The Journal of Law and Economics had been founded in 1958 by Aaron Di-
rector and later edited by Ronald Coase.
189. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Little, Brown & Com-
pany Limited 1972).
190. POSNER, supra note 178.
191. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on
Law., A Quantitative Study, 36 J. L. & ECON. 385 (1993) (using empirical analysis to
corroborate this thesis as early as 1993).
192. Eg., Anthony T. Kronman, The Second Driker Forum for Excellence in the
Law, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 115, 160 (1995).
193. See generally, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious
Past and Cloudy Future, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1167 (1997).
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ism in the earlier decades of the 20th century. However, while law
was still recognized as an autonomous discipline in the mid-20th cen-
tury, Richard Posner identifies a decline of this view in the 1960s. ' 9'
Posner argues that the reason for this decline is not the influence of
economics and related disciplines, but the end of a political consensus
among legal academics and the general loss of confidence in the abil-
ity of lawyers to solve the problems of modern society.19 This does
not necessarily imply that U.S. law scholarship exclusively, or even
primarily, uses the economic analysis of law. However, going back to
legal realism, a consequentialist perspective clearly predominates. A
legal scholar may choose between a variety of methodological ap-
proaches of various disciplines, including sociology and political sci-
ence.
As a consequence of the above, the work of legal scholars in the
United States is fundamentally different from that of legal faculties
elsewhere, including the work of academics in other common law
countries. Legal scholars are typically less interested in doctrinal de-
tails than in a study of the law from an external, interdisciplinary per-
spective.96 Scholarship does not bother with finding the "correct" in-
terpretation or with finding out what the law is, but is concerned with
legal policy and what the law should be. For this reason, law scholar-
ship has occasionally been criticized for having lost its usefulness to
practice (for example in finding analyzing and differentiating prece-
dents):' 97 Insofar as policy arguments outside the legal system are not
accepted by judges, the rejection of doctrinalism has made legal
scholarship less useful for practitioners.
A variety of other factors may help to explain why interdiscipli-
nary approaches gained so much ground in the U.S. The unusual
world of legal periodicals (compared both to other and to journals in
other legal systems) almost certainly accounts for a share in this de-
velopment. '98 Students decide about the acceptance and rejection of
194. Posner, supra note 179, at 761; contra, e.g., Charles Fried, The Artificial Rea-
son of Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35 (1981).
195. Posner, supra note 179, at 766-67; also cf Cheffins, supra note 27, at 201-02.
196. Cheffins, id at 198-99.
197. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 42-78 (1992).
198. For a descriptive account from the perspective of a German scholar of com-
parative law, see Reinhard Zimmermann, Law Reviews: A Foray Through A Strange
World, 47 EMORY L. J. 659 (1998).
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articles,' 99 and their gratuitous work allows authors to publish much
longer articles than in German-speaking countries. °' The articles
published by American law reviews, other than articles in typical
German-speaking journals, are hardly under any pressure to be im-
mediately useful to the practice of judges and lawyers, which facili-
tates focusing on interdisciplinary and theoretical issues. °' Further-
more, different from most other countries, law is a graduate degree in
the United States, many students have an academic or practical back-
ground in other fields, and those aiming at an academic career some-
times enroll in Ph.D. programs in economics, political science or phi-
losophy (or an MBA) before, parallel to, or after law school.' U.S.
law schools sometimes even employ economists with no formal train-
ing in law. Hence, many professors have the necessary methodologi-
cal background for law and economics, which also has an impact on
legal education.
E. Law and Economics as a Political Program?
An important criticism of economic analysis of law is its pur-
ported conservative slant in economic policy. 3 In our view, this claim
is incorrect, but has some justification before the specific background
in which law and economics began to thrive. Law and economics ar-
guments, particularly those attributed to the Chicago School, were of-
ten used to substantiate conservative political goals. Richard Posner,
often described as a conservative , is probably the best example: His
199. For a critical assessment, see James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994).
200. Occasionally, there have been articles spanning several hundred pages. See,
e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 20, which was first published as an article of
more than 400 pages in the Harvard Law Review. See generally Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001).
201. Cf Zimmermann, supra note 198, at 679-88.
202. Cf Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational
Actors. A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 23, 26
(1989) (providing figures for top-tier school law professors with a Ph.D. in econom-
ics).
203. E.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 126 (1987); Robert C. Downs, Law and Economics: Nexus of Science and
Beliefs, 27 PAC. L. J. 1, 19 (1995). Similar criticisms have been made in German-
speaking literature. See Taupitz, supra note 11, at 129-30, 133.
204. E.g., Robin Paul Malloy, Invisible Hand or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith,
Richard Posner and the Philosophy of Law and Economics, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 209
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theory that the common law tends towards efficiency 5 is a very good
argument against legislative intervention to the benefit of (purport-
edly) disfavored groups.
Posner's influential textbook, which is easily accessible to non-
economist readers, and his outstanding scholarship (also in terms of
quantitative output) have imprinted its image on how the law and
economics movement is seen by outsiders.206 Posner, and not Guido
Calabresi 2 0 came to be considered the leading figure of the move-
ment in its early days, which is sometimes attributed to the "imperial-
istic character" of his treatise .20 His proposals have sometimes been
radical and often idiosyncratic2 and have made him a popular target
210
of criticism .
The practical impact of this form of economic analysis is inti-
mately linked to two factors. On the one hand, some lawyer-
economists have been appointed as judges since Ronald Reagan took
office, e.g., Richard Posner in 1981. This did not just allow law and
economics to influence the case law directly, but also had some reper-
cussions on legal education. A study published in 2002211 found that a
(1988); Minda, supra note 55, at 373; contra Richard A. Posner, The New Institu-
tional Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 73, 83 (1993).
205. According to Posner, legal precedents have to maintain themselves in the
market: if a precedent case turns out to be economically untenable, the parties in-
volved will attempt to have it overruled, to which courts will eventually give in. Ac-
cording to Posner, this results in an evolutionary process that eventually yields effi-
cient law. POSNER, supra note 189; see also Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process
and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). The theory is of
course not universally accepted. See Kornhauser, supra note 140, at 591; Adam J.
Hirsch, Comment.- Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency." Reasons for
(Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U.L REV. 425 (2005); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei
Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. POL. ECON. 43 (2007) (differentiat-
ing).
206. Cf, e.g, James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics, 15 LAW &
HIST. REV. 275, 316 (1997).
207. Guido Calabresi is generally considered a liberal. See Horwitz, supra note
203, at 909.
208. KELMAN, supra note 203, at 117.
209. Cf, e.g., the proposal to deregulate the market for adoptions. See Elisabeth
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 323 (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67
B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987).
210. Cf KELMAN, supra note 203, at 117.
211. Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the
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few judges, who were incidentally also law teachers, dominate the se-
lection of jurisprudence in case books, with Richard Posner, Frank
Easterbrook and Ralph Winter, who are all associated with the Chi-
cago School,21 leading the field.
A second important point is the so-called "antitrust revolution,"
which accompanied the rise of law and economics. This term de-
scribes the abandonment of the extensive interpretation of the
Sherman Act, Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act213
that had dominated in the decades following World War II. This al-
lowed more leverage to the cleansing powers of the market; the Har-
vard School of antitrust, which had hitherto dominated industrial
economics and was skeptical towards large firms and conglomerates,
had to cede ground to the Chicago School, which was based on neo-
classical price theory and emphasized the inherent instability of mo-
nopolies. 1
From the 1980s onwards, the courts began to adopt Chicago
School views, such as the argument that antitrust should serve alloca-
tive efficiency only and neglect other goals, such as the protection of
small business.2 '5 The Department of Justice merger guidelines began
Superstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141,
1155 (2002).
212. Frank Easterbrook is known as an eminent scholar of corporate law and co-
author of a monograph on the subject, FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). Ralph Winter is a profes-
sor at Yale Law School and known in corporate law academia as the originator of the
"race to the top" view in the debate about regulatory competition in corporate law.
See Ralph Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corpo-
ration, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). Cf Gulati & Sanchez, id at 1166 ("Despite his
Yale background, many commentators consider Winter to be close in philosophy to
the Chicago brand of Law and Economics."); see also Stephan J. Choi & G. Mitu Gu-
lati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, 61 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L.
19 (2005) (identifying Judges Posner and Easterbrook as the ones with the largest
number of published opinions).
213. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000); Clayton Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2000); Federal Trade Commissions Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000).
214. See Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust
Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 226-66 (1995); cf Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEX, L. REV. 1, 2 (1984).
215. Cf Jacobs, id at 220-21; see, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Ra-
dio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1986); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pa-
cific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,296 (1985); National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104-07 (1984); andparticu-
larly Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977).
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to reflect these views as well. 216 Meanwhile, a counter-movement has
emerged, the so-called "post-Chicago" antitrust, whose influence is
already reflected in the case law.217
It can hardly be denied that the growth of law and economics has
to be seen before a specific political backdrop. The Chicago School,
which dominates the outside view of law and economics," 8 is the tar-
get of most of the criticism launched both inside and outside the
United States. As practitioners of law and economics, we share the
view that an outright condemnation of an economic approach to law
is misguided, as there are other schools of thought that do not share
this alleged political agenda.219 Politics is of course an issue where law
and economics attempts to set normative guidelines for legal policy:
In order to be able to say whether a specific legal norm is efficient (or
just more efficient than an alternative), one needs to define efficiency
as an objective.22° Under a utilitarian objective function, total utility is
216. Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L. J. 271, 273-74 (1987).
See. the so-called "more economic approach" that is gaining ground in European an-
titrust law. See, e.g., Ingo L.O. Schmidt, The Suitability of the More Economic Ap-
proach for Competition Policy- Dynamic v. Static Efficiency, 28 EUR. COMPETITION
L. REV. 408 (2007).
217. See Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes it on the Chin: Imperfect Information
Could Play a Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST L. J. 193 (1993); Jacobs,
supra note 214, at 246-47 (both citing the Supreme Court opinion of Image Technical
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 504 U.S. 451 (1992) as evidence for a "Post-
Chicago" approach).
218. See, e.g., Rowley, supra note 18, at24 (explaining that the Chicago approach
dominated the early research program of L&E, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Law and
Economics: Paradigm, Politics, or Philosophy, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 233, 237
(Nicholas Mercuro ed, Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989); supra note 19.
219. See, e.g., Minda, supra note 109, at 111, n.3; MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra
note 60, at 79; Ejan Mackaay, Schools. General, in 0500 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 402, 410 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
De Geest eds., 2000); see also Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional
Schools in Law and Economics, 18 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 259, 264-65 (2004); Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 218, at 234; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Economics, Public Policy,
and Law, 26 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 1, 1 (1996) ("Economics is method,
not ideology."); cf Ulen, supra note 53, at 408 (speaking of a "process of inquiry").
Authors such as Guido Calabresi, Steven Shavell and A. Mitchell Polinsky have been
said to adhere to the "New Haven School" or "Reformist School." See MERCURO &
MEDEMA, supra note 60, at 80; Wetlaufer, supra note 60, at 37; Mackaay, supra note
54, at 412; cf Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Cul-
ture, 1986 DUKE L. J. 929 (1986); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 218, at 235-36, 255,
n.19.
220. Some leading law and economics scholars explictly denounce the term effi-
ciency as being merely a tool to approximate the maximization of total individual
well-being. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 20, at 37.
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maximized, which results in a measurement problem. One simple so-
lution is to use total wealth as the objective, which in many cases will
constitute a permissible simplification of the analysis,"' at least when
supplemental predictions on tendencies (such as risk aversion or the
declining marginal utility of wealth) are permitted. However, using
total wealth as the ultimate objective has obvious distributive ramifi-
cations.
Richard Posner's attempt to distinguish his own approach from
utilitarianism by using wealth as the only value to be considered222 did
not prevail in the debate.2 3 Many legal economists today aim at the
maximization of total human utility or social welfare as such.224 Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell explicitly include the distribution of in-
come into their welfare economic conception and point out that the
declining marginal utility of wealth will often be an argument in favor
of redistribution from the rich to the poor,22 although the problem of
measurement has by no means been solved. Wealth maximization,
which is blind towards distribution, is today only seen as a means to
approximate utility maximization by most.226 The same applies to
Pareto efficiency (a set of endowments is considered Pareto efficient
when no one's position can be improved by harming another per-
son) 27 - essentially a minimum consensus position that should be ac-
221. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 20, at 37.
222. Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 18; Posner, Ethical and Political Basis, su-
pra note 18.
223. Contra e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value 9, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
191 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980).
224. The outlines of this approach can already by discerned in CALABRESI, supra
note 20; for more detailed arguments see Calabresi, About Law and Economics, su-
pra note 20; Calabresi, The new economics analysis of law, supra note 20, at 89;
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger
Slice?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671 (1980); KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 20. For a
summary of the discussion, see Parisi, Changing Contours, supra note 18, at 44-48.
225. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, id at 29 passim. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV. 305 (1993) (giving
a historical account).
226. Even Richard Posner seems to have abandoned his original perspective. See
Posner, Ethics, supra note 18, at 265 ("...I never suggested that [wealth] is the only
social value..."); Posner, Problematics, supra note 18, at 1670 note 62; see also Parisi,
Changing Contours, supra note 18, at 47; Rowley, supra note 18, at 21-22. C£ Her-
bert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63
(1990) (describing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as measuring wealth, not utility).
227. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R.
GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 313 (Oxford University Press 1995); ROBERT
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ceptable to all - and to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (an increase in to-
tal utility is presumed when a change in endowments, by means of
e.g., a change in the law, would theoretically allows its beneficiary to
compensate the loser, even if compensation does not actually take
place). 8 In any case, the selection of a normative criterion is not an
issue of the methods of economics, but of the underlying moral, phi-
losophical and political premises. 9
It suffices to conclude that the rapid spread of law and economics
in the United States appears to have been bolstered by the close con-
nection between one of its leading schools with a political current that
was on the rise at this time. However, this should not tempt legal
scholars to reject economic methods outright.
V. The Development in German-Speaking Europe
A. Law and Economics in the late 19th century
Early antecedents of modern law and economics date back to the
end of the 19th century and can be traced to German-speaking
Europe, particularly to Vienna, the capital of the Habsburg Empire.23 °
One of the pioneers of economic analysis of law was Victor Mataja, a
professor of political economy and later a member of the government
as commerce secretary. Mataja's most important work in this field
was certainly his monograph "Das Recht des Schadensersatzes vom
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (Scott, Foresman and Company
3d ed. 2000).
228. See, e.g., Heico Kerkmeester, Methodology.- General, in 2000
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 383, 386 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000), available at <http://allserv.
rug.ac.be/-gdegeest/>; but cf Christopher T. Wonnell, Efficiency and Conservatism,
80 NEB. L. REv. 643, 695 (2001) (arguing that Kaldor-Hicks-Kriterium is distorted to
the detriment of the poor).
229. Kornhauser, supra note 163, at 354.
230. Law and economics scholarship includes e.g. MATAJA, supra note 164;
KLEINWACHTER, supra note 164; ANTON MENGER, DAS BORGERLICHE RECHT UND
DIE BESITZLOSEN VOLKSKLASSEN (1890), available at <http://dlib-
pr.mpier.mpg.de/mikleioc/0010/exec/books/%22172083%22>. The Freiburg School
of Economics of the 1930s and 1940s also addressed the economic role of legal insti-
tutions, but in a rather different way than contemporary law and economics; see
Franz B6hm, Die Forschungs- und Lehrgemeinschaft zwischen Juristen und
Volkswirten an der Universitat Freiburg in den dreiBiger und vierzigerJahren des 20
Jahrhunderts in HANS JULIUS WOLFF (ED.), AUS DER GESCHICHTE DER RECHTS- UND
STAATSWISSENSCHAFTEN zu FREIBURG IM BREISGAU (1957) 95-113.
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Standpunkte der Nationalokonomie" ("The law of torts and contrac-
tual liability from the point of view of political economy"), published
in 1988. 3' Mataja anticipated central ideas of the 20th century law
and economics movement. In spite of his revolutionary methodology,
his book had no lasting influence on legal scholarship and practice."
Similar to modern law and economics, Mataja emphasized the
incentive effects of tort law which lead him to criticize the negligence
rule.2 3' He suggested that, under the rule of negligence, the incentives
for preventing the damage were lower than socially optimal because
the tortfeasor would not exercise more care than required by the law.
On the contrary, strict liability would set optimal incentives because
the damage costs would be internalized and the tortfeasor would
minimize total costs. In the case of an act of God, he argued that the
costs of damage should not be borne by the owner but by the one who
can best prevent the damage.23 Mataja focused not only on incentive
effects, but discussed other principles as well. He noted that, due to
the decreasing marginal utility of wealth, the costs of damage should
be spread over more than one person."'
Mataja made several further arguments that were truly novel for
his time 236 and certainly would have been a condign founding father of
a law and economics movement. His contemporaries did not ignore
his 1888 monograph, and in the course of the discussions leading to
the German Civil Code, Mataja was cited and discussed by legal
scholars during the debate on the respective merits of negligence and
231. Mataja published another article on liability where he discussed the upcom-
ing reforms: Victor Mataja, Das Schadenersatzrecht im Entwurf eines BOrgerlichen
Geselzbuches fur das Deutsche Reich, 1 ARCHIV FOR BORGERLICHES RECHT 267
(1889).
232. For a more detailed discussion, see Englard, supra note 15, and Winkler, su-
pra note 24.
233. MATAJA, supra note 164, at 23-24, 32 passim.; cf Bohm-Bawerk, supra note
39, at 420-21; contemporary literature includes, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 179-80 (2004).
234. Cf the cheapest cost-avoider literature, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 135-73, 261-63 (1970); Guido
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.
J. 1055, 1060 (1972); Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 13, 27-28 (1972).
235. MATAJA, supra note 164, at 27 (referring to B6hm-Bawerk).
236. See, e.g., his discussion on compulsory insurance for accidents at work and
occupational disease, MATAJA, supra note 164, at 85, 111.
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strict liability. 7 Outside of German speaking countries, Mataja was
picked up, among others, by the French scholar Teisseire in his 1901
book Essai d'une thdorie g6n6rale sur le fondement de la responsabi-
it, and by the Hungarian scholar G6za Marton.238 The professional
positions Mataja held made him an important figure in the contempo-
rary debate.
The economic methods that were needed to develop interdisci-
plinary theories were already well advanced at that time,239 and the
discussion on private law (e.g., freedom of contract) had largely be-
come an economic debate as far as the most fundamental issues were
concerned. ' Institutionally, the disciplines were combined at the
University of Vienna in one school, and the law curriculum included a
significant amount of economics. Jurists such as Carl Menger and
Bohm-Bawerk were appointed professors of economics. 241 Any per-
sisting fears of contact between scholars of the two disciplines242
should have been overcome without great difficulty. Overall, the
scholarly environment seemed downright cut out to initiate a school
243
of law and economics. It almost comes as a surprise that Mataja did
not spark a law and economics movement comparable to the one
starting in the 1960s in the U.S.
The legitimacy of economic arguments in the legal discourse was
never fully recognized and subject to a dispute between economists
and lawyers. Economists, such as Bohm-Bawerk, supported Mataja's
approach and praised his work as an important contribution to inter-
disciplinary research.2" Carl Menger, one of the founding fathers of
237. See, e.g., MAX ROMELIN, DIE GRONDE DER SCHADENSZURECHNUNG UND
DIE STELLUNG DES DEUTSCHEN BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS ZUR OBJEKTIVEN
SCHADENERSATZPFLICHT (1896).
238. Ct Englard, supra note 15, at 183.
239. With regard to the marginalist revolution, see, e.g., ERNESTO SCREPANTI &
STEFANO ZAMAGNI, AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 145 pas-
sim (1995); Hovenkamp, supra note 225, at 308 passim (arguing that marginalism had
a strong impact on legal thought).
240. SIBYLLE HOFER, FREIHEIT OHNE GRENZEN 98 (2001). Of course, details
were mainly discussed in the legal discourse. Id.
241. Winkler, supra note 24, at 276.
242. See Bohm-Bawerk, supra note 39, at 418 passim.
243. HERMANN KANTOROWIcz, DER KAMPF UM DIE RECHTSWlSSENSCHAFT 38
(Nomos 2002) (1906); Bohm-Bawerk, supra note 39, at 419.
244. Bohm-Bawerk, supra note 39, at 418passim. Also Emil Steinbach, Die
Rechtsgrundlage, betreffend den Ersatz von Vermogensschaden 21 JURISTISCHE
BLATrER 243, n.1 (1888) praises Mataja's work.
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the Austrian School of Economics, criticized the conservative attitude
of the predominant Savignyan jurisprudence.245 Even some lawyers,
such as Carl Menger's brother Anton, a professor of civil procedural,
recognized that the historical school of jurisprudence was an im-
proper approach for reforms and for policy discussions. 24' However,
Anton Menger's opinion remained rather exceptional. Even most of
those members of the legal community who favored Mataja's prefer-
ence for strict liability rejected his approach . 7 Without further justi-
fication, Windscheid, Laband and other lawyers argued that ethical,
political and economic considerations were not part of a lawyers'
work.2 48 Even Ruimelin, a seemingly progressive thinker, argued that
Matajas "whole train of thoughts was morbid". 4 Similarly, Erwin
Steinitzer's 1908 Okonomische Theorie der Aktiengesellschaft (Eco-
nomic Theory of the Public Corporation) and other pioneering works
of economic analysis gained little influence, even though Steinitzer,
much like Mataja, anticipated several insights of modern law and
economics. Among those were the principal-agent problem2 ° and the
perspective of the corporation as a nexus of contracts. 5
The decline of the early law and economics movement was as-
cribed to the increasing specialization of the social sciences and to the
plurality of the economic methods. Some argued that economics as a
scholarly discipline was underdeveloped. Applying its "preliminary
245. Cf T.W. Hutchison, Some Themes from Investigations into Method, in JOHN
R. HICKS & WILHELM WEBER, CARL MENGER AND THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF
ECONOMICS 15, 26-27 (1973).
246. MENGER, supra note 230, at 5, 10; cf HOFER, supra note 240, at 134.
247. Englard, supra note 15, at 187.
248. Bernhard Windscheid, Die Aufgaben der Rechtswissenschaft, in PAUL
OERTMANN, BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, GESAMMELTE REDEN UND ABHANDLUNGEN
112 (1904); see Paul Oertmann, Windscheid als Jurist, in OERTMANN, id. at XXXIII;
WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 431. PAUL LABAND, DAS STAATSRECHT DES
DEUTSCHEN REICHS (2d. ed. 1888) (arguing that, even though he esteemed disciplines
such as history, economics, politics and philosophy, they were irrelevant for legal in-
terpretation).
249. ROMELIN, supra note 237, at 7 (1896); cf KNUT W. NORR, ZWISCHEN DEN
MOHLSTEINEN 38 (1988) (arguing that economics had little influence on the legal dis-
cussion).
250. ERWIN STEINITZER, OKONOMISCHE THEORIE DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 55
passim (1908).
251. Id. at 48; compare contemporary research regarding "nexus of contracts,"
e.g., Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976).
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results" to the law would have led to an increased uncertainty. 22 Of
course, there were always controversies in the legal debate on the va-
lidity of certain legal methods just as in the economic debate. More-
over, different perspectives and traditions within both legal scholar-
ship and economics 253 did not hinder the evolution of the discipline in
the United States.
The critical point for why Mataja did not initiate a law and eco-
nomics movement was that the doctrinal method of his time was un-
able to integrate economic ideas. Legal methodology was strongly
committed to systematization and coherence in the interpretation of
legal norms. A reform that would have introduced a sudden change
independent of the current law would have required an immense re-
construction of the legal system in order to find and form a new co-
herent interpretation of the entire edifice.5  For example, replacing
the negligence standard in tort law with strict liability would have
made a great number of scholarly writings as well as court decisions
obsolete, and would have required a reconstruction of all statutes
based on the negligence standard, including rules of contributory and
comparative negligence. Such a reinterpretation would have been
unavoidable, as jurists believed that the legitimacy of legal norms was
based on their consistency;255 ideally, not a single norm in the legal
system should contradict another one. Consequently, amendments
based on economic arguments would have been perceived as external
shocks alien to the system of 19th century conceptual formalism.256
Unsurprisingly, Mataja's proposal for strict liability was criticized and
eventually rejected.257
252. PEARSON, supra note 54, at 43, 131; Mackaay, supra note 54, at 70. See also
Bohm-Bawerk, supra note 39, at 418-19 (arguing that the fact that "economics was
not a mature discipline" could be an obstacle to interdisciplinary research).
253. See MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 60.
254. CG SCHAFER & OTr, supra note 24, at 52; for a critical assessment of this ar-
gument see MAT'rEI, supra note 5, at 82.
255. WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 401. Compare the struggle for legal positivism
and coherence, e.g., CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, SYSTEMDENKEN UND
SYSTEMBEGRIFF IN DER JURISPRUDENZ 121 (1969) (arguing that the judge must
strictly abide the law but also acknowledging that statutes are not always coherent).
256. Conceptual formalism only allowed changes that were inherent in the sys-
tem, most importantly through deductions based on legal concepts; see GEORG F.
PUCHTA, CURSUS DER INSTITUTIONEN, BAND 1. EINLEITUNG IN DIE
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT UND GESCHICHTE DES RECHTS BEY DEM ROMISCHEN VOLK 36
(1841).
257. RUMELIN, supra note 237, at 6.
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This "methodological" rejection was supported by political fac-
tors. The law and economics scholars of the late 19th century, other
than some of their American descendents in the 1970s, tended to pro-
pose reforms that ran contrary to the decision makers' interests.
More progressive legal scholars such as Anton Menger criticized the
law for protecting the interests of the ruling class.258 Interdisciplinary
research was often rejected by those who preferred the existing law. 9
By contrast, a significant part of the later U.S. law and economics lit-
erature was dedicated to explaining why the existing law was optimal,
partly to legitimize the case law via interferences by statutory law.26
B. An Internal View of Policy and Interpretation
Several critics have repeatedly pointed to the marginalization of
policy in German legal scholarship.261 This is relevant for our theory
since law and economics was a normative movement that introduced
258. MENGER, supra note 230, passim (criticizing the draft on a German Civil
Code).
259. Grimm, supra note 42, at 489. Cf WEACKER, supra note 62, at 442.
260. This approach is borne by the theory that the common law moves towards
efficiency; For references, see supra note 205.
261. E.g. Luhmann, supra note 42, at 11, 193; Ernst Fuchs, Gerechtigkeitswissen-
schaft, JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 8 (1920), reprintedin ALBERT FOULKES, ERNST
FUCHS - GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN OBER FREIRECHT UND RECHTSREFORM, 1973 (cri-
tizising that there is no "Gerechtigkeitswissenschaft," ie., no legal discipline discuss-
ing justice); THEO MAYER-MALY, RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 201 (1972); Ota Weinber-
ger, Zur Theorie der Gesetzgebung, in JOHANN MOKRE & OTA WEINBERGER,
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE UND GESETZGEBUNG 173 (1976); HELMUT SCHELSKY, DIE
SOZIOLOGEN UND DAS RECHT 59 passim (1980); PETER NOLL,
GESETZGEBUNGSLEHRE 9, 14 (1973); Theo Ohlinger, Planung der Gesetzgebung und
Wissenschaft - Einfuhrung in das Tagungsthema, in THEO OHLINGER, METHODIK
DER GESETZGEBUNG - LEGISTISCHE RICHTLINIEN IN THEORIE UND PRAXIS 1 (1982);
VLADIMIR KUBE;, THEORIE DER GESETZGEBUNG (1987); Markus Lammer, Grund-
fragen der Gesetzgebungslehre, in WOLFGANG MANTL, EFFIZIENZ DER
GESETZESPRODUKTION 60-61 (1995); Michael Holoubek, Rechtswissenschaftliche
Rechtspolitik? Pladoyer fur einen (weiteren) Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaften,
in MICHAEL HOLOUBEK & GEORG LIENBACHER, RECHTSPOLITIK DER ZUKUNFT -
ZUKUNFT DER RECHTSPOLITIK 13, 18 (1999); Arthus Kaufmann, Historischer
Diskurs, in ARTHUR KAUFMANN, WINFRIED HASSEMER & ULFRID NEUMANN,
EINFUHRUNG IN RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE DER GEGENWART 110
passim (2002); Alfred Bullesbach, Rechtswissenschaft und Sozialwissenschaft, in
ARTHUR KAUFMANN, WINFRIED HASSEMER & ULFRID NEUMANN, EINFUHRUNG IN
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE DER GEGENWART 416 (2002). Britta
Rehder, What is Political About Jurisprudence? Courts, Politics and Political Science
in Europe and the United States, MPLFG DISCUSSION PAPER (May 2007), available at
<http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg-dp/dpO7-5.pdf>.
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policy criteria into the legal debate. In order to better understand
why the mainstream approach was not receptive to (economic) policy
considerations it is worthwhile looking at the evolution of legal meth-
ods. A central point was the self-reference of the legal discourse
which meant that arguments for both interpretation and policy were
to be found in the existing law. This tradition can be traced to the
19th century Historical School of Savigny, which proposed to take the
customs of ancient Roman law as a model, and reemerged in a differ-
ent shade in Hans Kelsen's 20th century Pure Theory of Law.
Whereas Savigny proposed to make policy considerations de-
pendent on the existing law, Kelsen argued that policy should be en-
tirely be excluded from "legal science. 262 In light of the success of
these movements in German-speaking countries, the law and sociol-
ogy literature has tried to interpret the law as an autopoietic system
which was supposed to operate widely autonomous from other sub-
systems of society. 263 This focus on systematization was coined both
by the natural law approach as well as by the Historical School 264 and
led to an overemphasis of the non-contradiction condition in the law.
Under these premises, it was not surprising that any reform had to be
consistent with the existing law.265
A decisive development preceding the Historical School of Law
was the rise of historicism towards the end of the 18th century. Jo-
hann Gottfried Herder and others sparked the separation of the hu-
manities from philosophy.2  Phenomena were increasingly viewed in
their historical context, discussed with reference to their origins and
explained in a dynamic way of movements and developments. To
think historically meant to put oneself in the Zeitgeist of the respec-
tive age and understand the problem "from within., 267 Whereas Leo-
262. See Kaufmann, supra note 261, at 124-25.
263. See, e.g., GUNTHER TEUBNER, RECHT ALS AUTOPOIETISCHES SYSTEM (1989).
264. Kaufmann, supra note 261, at 82. WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 372 passim
(arguing that the Historical School of Law and the Natural Law approach were quite
similar in this respect).
265. See HERGET, supra note 1, at 104-06, 110 (arguing that, in Germany, system,
structure and coherence were disproportionately important compared to American
legal thought).
266. See, e.g., GUNNAR SKIRBEKK & NiLs GLUE, GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE
VOL II 552 passim (1987).
267. JOHANN G. HERDER, AUCH EINE PHILOSOPHIE DER GESCHICHTE ZUR
BILDUNG DER MENSCHHEIT 37 (1774, Suhrkamp 1967) (arguing that one should "go
inside the specific age, the area, and the history in general, and feel everything from
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pold von Ranke contributed to the "science of history,"2 Friedrich
Carl von Savigny was the main proponent of a "science of law" as an
independent discipline. Like Herder, Savigny aspired to explain legal
phenomena as an outgrowth of their respective historical context,
which was most explicitly expressed in Volksgeist (Spirit of the Peo-
ple). 26
9
Savigny's Historical School was the basis for today's approach to
policy. 2  In his influential 1814 work, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fAr
Gesetzgebung undRechtswissenschaft,(On the Vocation of Our Time
for Legislation and Legal Science) he argued that the Volksgeist was
an expression of the law and it was to be found in the Roman Law
and not in codifications. This was an attack on the natural law ap-
proach that presumed that the optimal law could be derived in a ra-
tional manner, without regard to its historical evolution. Similarly,
Gustav von Hugo argued that the natural law was unable to offer
clear results and that policy should adhere to current and past cus-
toms.
27 2
In fact, Savigny had written Vom Beruf in reaction to Anton
Friedrich Justus Thibaut's Uber die Notwendigkeit eines algemeinen
bOrgerlichen Rechts in Deutschland (On the Necessity of a General
Civil Law in Germany), which had been published in the same year.
Thibaut claimed that the law must always be wise and independent
from current and past customs. This was possible only if external cri-
teria were used273 and, as he believed, it was the only way to change
unjust law. For Thibaut, the conventional legal thought of his age was
extremely conservative as it tried to maintain the existing social and
within").
268. See, e.g., SKIRBEKK & GIUE, supra note 266, at 559.
269. See WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 356 (explaining the influence of HERDER
on SAVIGNY).
270. Billesbach, supra note 261, at 416.
271. FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSERER ZEIT FOR
GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1814).
272. WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 379-80. Regarding Savingy's position via the
Natural Law approach compare HORST SCHRODER, FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY
- GESCHICHTE UND RECHTSDENKEN BEIM UBERGANG VOM FEUDALISMUS ZUM
KAPITALISMUS IN DEUTSCHLAND 257 passim (1984).
273. ANTON FJ. THIBAUT, OBER DIE NOTWENDIGKEIT EINES ALLGEMEINEN
BORGERLICHEN RECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND 12-13 (1814, reprint Goldbach 1997) (ar-
guing that legal norms not only have to be "clear, unequivocal, and comprehensive"
but that they must also be "wise" and "appropriate".).
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economic order. 74 He criticized the fact that there were few scholars
sufficiently knowledgeable to draft such general, abstract laws.275
The dispute between Thibaut and Savigny was not much differ-
ent from Bentham's attack on Blackstone. However, external criteria
like the maximization of some intrinsic good, were not explicitly ad-
dressed in the German dispute, and they eventually lost their impor-
tance in the following decades as Savigny's Historical School began to
dominate the scene.
For Savigny, the law was to be found in customs, legal scholar-
ship and the practice, most importantly from concepts of Roman Law.
He argued that Roman Law embodied the true will of the people as a
whole. However, this interpretation of the Volksgeist was presumed
to be independent of social and political movements. Savigny did not
believe that the law bad an end in itself.276 However, his approach re-
quired this assumption to allow further interpretative work by jurists!
It denied a social function and legitimized the law on its historical
evolution, for which reason it was impermissible to question its social
adequacy. Clearly, non-legal criteria were necessary for the original
development of the Historical School of Law; once this approach was
accepted, external criteria became superfluous.277
From today's perspective, Savigny's approach was strictly con-
278
servative in the sense that it was opposed to change and progress.
Under this theory, any changes had to be changes through interpreta-
tion, which meant that Savigny allocated the decision-making author-
ity to the legal community instead of philosophers or the govern-
ment.279 This allocation of powers was affirmed by Puchta's approach,
which created a monopoly of the legal community to interpret and
thereby to make law.2° Over the course of the 19th century, the jurist
274. Id at 58.
275. Id at 38.
276. SAVIGNY, supra note 271, at 18 (explicitly stating that the law had no end in
itself).
277. Grimm, supra note 42, at 476-77. SCHRODER, supra note 272, at 215-218 pas-
sim (explaining how Savigny suppressed philosophical inquiries in his theory).
278. See WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 383, 385. Cf JOACHIM WEGE, POSITIVES
RECHT UND SOZIALER WANDEL IM DEMOKRATISCHEN UND SOZIALEN RECHTSSTAAT
132 passim (1977) (arguing that legal positivism is used to maintain the status quo).
279. SAVIGNY, supra note 271, at 7-8 (explicitly stating that under his theory the
people are represented by lawyers). Cf WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 392; DAWSON,
supra note 62, at 456-57.
280. GEORG F. PUCHTA, DAS GEWOHNHEITSRECHT (1828, 1837). WIEACKER, SU-
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class obtained not just their own discipline, independent of philoso-
phy; but they also played a major role in the decision-making process
through their interpretative competences.
This idiosyncratic allocation of important decision-making power
to jurists, as it was brought forward by Savigny and his followers,
meant that other authorities were restrained from implementing re-
forms if those reforms were incoherent with the existing concepts) 8'
This consequence closely relates to Savigny's argument that codifica-
tion and statutory law were an expression of authoritative power and
not the people's will.m Savigny apparently believed that allocating
decision rights to lawyers was in the interest of the people, and that
no other interest group was better suited as its representative. 3
Due to the inherent indeterminacy of the law, personal, moral
views of jurists were ultimately allowed to enter the legal system. 4 In
order to build and maintain the lawyers' empire, lawyers believed (or
pretended) to rely on an objective, impartial method which excluded
political issues. This was the only way to gain acceptance as an inde-
pendent authority in this pre-democratic period. The presumably de-
politicized law was used to synthesize the feudal system with the de-
veloping capitalistic one .
Several scholars criticized the Historical School, among others,
Hegel in his treatise on legal philosophy of 1821286 and Kirchmann in
his famous speech of 18472. Much later, the free-law movement at-
pra note 62, at 399; Grimm, supra note 42, at 478 (both arguing that Puchta consoli-
dated the lawyers' monopoly).
281. Grimm, supra note 42, at 475.
282. Cf SAVIGNY, supra note 271, at 10, 21.
283. See, e.g., KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, DIE DEUTSCHE IDEOLOGIE
(1845-46; published 1932); MENGER, supra note 230, at 12-14; Hermann Kantorowicz,
Savigny and the Historical School of Law, 53 L. Q. REV. 335 (1937); Reimann, supra
note 62, at 95, 110. For an extensive elaboration of the political components of Savi-
gny's theory see SCHRODER, supra note 272.
284. Cf Grimm, supra note 42, at 482,484.
285. SCHRODER, supra note 272, at 221-22, 276.
286. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS 182-83, §
211 (Felix Meiner 1995) (1821).
287. JULIUS H.v. KIRCHMANN, UBER DIE WERTLOSIGKEIT DER JURISPRUDENZ
ALS WISSENSCHAFT (1847-48) (arguing that the exclusion of politicy from the disci-
pline of law is a misery); ct RUDOLF MOLLER-ERZBACH, WOHIN FOHRT DIE
INTERESSENJURISPRUDENz? 36 (1932); cf KERSTING, POLITIK UND RECHT,
ABHANDLUNGEN ZUR POLITISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART UND ZUR
NEUZEITLICHEN RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 342 (2000).
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tacked Savigny's methods' but the Historical School had already too
thoroughly penetrated the legal community for subsequent change to
be possible.289 Puchta,2 6 Windscheid,291 Gerber, and other propo-
nents of the Historical School's "Romanistic" and "Germanistic"
branches perpetuated Savigny's approach that was initially developed
for private law, but also applied to public law.293 Their methods were
clearly directed at restating the existing law and not at reform.9 With
Puchta, the emphasis on the jurists' law resulted in an ever growing
belief in coherence, systematization and constructivism 9  Puchta's
emphasis of legal terms led to a separation of law from social circum-
296 291
stances, something that Savigny had predicted would happen.
Even the "Germanistic" branch of the Historical School, which was con-
cerned about 19th century industrialization, widely approved of legal sci-
ence as an instrument independent from social consequences.
298
Ironically, the codifications of the early 19th century, which were
drafted under natural law principles, favored this separation. They
created legal material that lawyers could work with, so that the law-
yers did not need to revert to natural law anymore in order to find le-
gal norms.9  Clearly, the presumption was that external criteria were
accounted for through legislation and once accepted would not be
288. See, e.g., Kantorowicz, supra note 283, at 326.
289. See Miller-Erzbach, supra note 287, at 36. WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 382-
83 (explaining Savigny's role in this development); for further references see Kan-
torowicz, supra note 283, at 326.
290. GEORG F. PUCHTA, LEHRBUCH DER PANDEKTEN 29-30, § 16 (Leipzig, 9th ed.
1863) (1838).
291. BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, DIE GESCHICHTLICHE SCHULE IN DER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, NORD UND SOD, VOL IV 42 passim (1878), reprinted in
OERTMANN, supra note 248, at 66 passinm, Eck, Gedachnisrede 17 cited in Oertmann,
Windscheid als Jurist, supra note 248, at XXXI.
292. CARL F. GERBER, SYSTEM DES DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS (1848); CARL F.
GERBER, GESAMMELTE JURISTISCHE ABHANDLUNGEN (1872).
293. See, e.g., CARL F. GERBER, OBER OFFENTLICHE RECHTE (1852). Other pro-
ponents were Laband und Jellinek; see Alexander Somek, German legal philosophy
and theory in the nineteenth and twentieth century in PATTERSON, A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 347-48 (1999).
294. Grimm, supra note 42, at 479 (with reference to Puchta).
295. Id. at 478.
296. PUCIrrA, supra note 256, at 36-37.
297. SAVIGNY, supra note 271, at 18; cf HERGET, supra note 1, at 110-11.
298. Grimm, supra note 42, at 480 passim (with reference to Gerber).
299. Id. at 472.
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questioned? ° New legal norms could then only be created within the
boundaries of the legal constructs. In a way, 19th century legal sci-
ence returned to a similar kind of formalism of which they had ac-
cused the earlier natural law movement." The Kodifikationsfrage
(the dispute about codification)m was carried out between those who
were in favor of codification and those that were against it because a
codification would neglect the historical evolution of the law. This
dispute eventually unraveled, at least for Windscheid, by codifying
the historically evolved law.303
This separation of legal science from social circumstances was
supported by an engrained anti-consequentialist tenor of German
philosophy, most importantly of German Idealism. Even though
German Idealism was opposed to the Historical School, the exclusion
of social consequences was inherent in both schools.?° Kant thought
that the moral value of something could not be judged by the conse-
quences, but that there was a value in itself,3°5 which was subject to
pre-empirical and not empirical knowledge.' German Idealism
300. GERBER, SYSTEM, supra note 292, at XI (5th ed. 1955) (1848). This was
closely connected to the decreasing use of a historical interpretation of legal norms;
cf DAWSON, supra note 62, at 444-45.
301. WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 372-401 (arguing that legal positivism and the
natural law approach had a similar methodology).
302. For a short summary see WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 390 passim.
303. See WINDSCHEID, supra note 291, at 75: "Are these really the alternatives:
Either a codification or the centuries of legal work ... We want the code and the
centuries of legal work as well."; cf BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, RECHT UND
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, GREIFSWALDER UNIVERSITATS-FESTREDE (1854), reprinted
in OERTMANN, supra note 248, at 19. It is worthwhile noting that Savigny was not
entirely and at all times against codifications but he was strictly opposed to statutory
law independent of the existing law. SAVIGNY, supra note 271, at 10-11.
304. Concerning the influence of German Philosophy on Savigny, see SCHRODER,
supra note 272, at 215-27, (arguing, however, that Savigny often misunderstood phi-
losophical writings). Regarding the influence of Kant and Fichte on Savigny, see
KNUT W. NORR, Savignys Anschauung und Kants Urteilskraft in FESTSCHRIFr FOR
HELMUT COING VOL I 615 passim (1982); cf WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 373-74 (ar-
guing that Kant's work "Critique of Pure Reason" was the historical basis of formal-
ism, most importantly of legal positivism).
305. Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten (1795):
In the realm of ends everything has either a price or a worth. Anything with
a price can be replaced by something else as its quivalent, whereas anything
that is above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has worth...
neither nature nor art can supply anything that would make up for that lack
in you; for their value doesn't lie in the effects that flow from them....
306. OTFRIED HOFFE, EINFOHRUNG IN DIE UTILITARISTISCHE ETHIK 43-44 (1992).
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formed the basis of influential 20th century writing and clearly ran
contrary to utilitarianism, and thus, contrary to law and economics.
Anti-consequentionalism was only slowly starting to be discredited
with Hegel, who used history to explain the current state of affairs.3°s
However, historicism was characterized by idealism until Karl Marx
and his dialectic materialism challenged it in a way that influenced,
even though indirectly, the legal discussion. This was the starting
point for a widespread emphasis on the consequences of legal norms
and the demystification of law - a development that eventually led to
the free-law movement. In spite of this development, utilitarianism
was not gaining acceptance. Even consequentialists like Marx criti-
cized utilitarian ethics because they thought it impossible to reduce
human wants and desires to a single measure, utility.3" Critics of legal
positivism such as Scheler und Hartmann developed approaches
based on natural law and explicitly turned against utilitarianism."O
Virtually all important legal writings were based on idealistic ap-
proaches and were clearly anti-utilitarian.'
Few lawyers in the German-speaking area of Europe were pro-
utilitarian, with Jhering as a prominent exception. Jhering, however,
used a sociological, not an economic approach, and his theory of legal
evolution used external criteria only to a limited extent. Under his
theory, the law emerged as a result of a struggled in which people owe
a duty to themselves to fight for their rights.3" An infringement of
rights was an injury to one's sense of justice or one's moral integrity.313
This violation, however, Jhering argued, was not a certain utility loss
307. See, e.g., NICOLAI HARTMANN, ETHIK (1926); RUDOLF STAMMLER, DIE
LEHRE VOM RICHTIGEN RECHTE (1902); KARL LARENZ, RICHTIGES RECHT (1979).
Cf KERSTING, supra note 287, at 367 (arguing that Stammler did not fully understand
Kant); NORR, supra note 249, at 33.
308. ALFRED VERDROSS, ABENDLANDISCHE RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 161 (1963)
(calling Hegel a follower of the Historical School of Law). But cf supra note 286,
regarding Hegel's critique on Savigny.
309. MARX & ENGELS, supra note 283, at 394 passim (arguing that utilitarianism is
a "theory of mutual exploitation" ).
310. MAX SCHELER, DER FORMALISMUS IN DER ETHIK UND DIE MATERIALE
WERTETHIK (1913-1916), GESAMMELTE WERKE 2, at 350 (1954); HARTMANN, supra
note 307, at 79-80. These approaches were further developed by Coing and others;
WIEACKER, supra note 62, at 591-92. For further references, see VERDROSS, supra
note 308, at 205 passim (arguing that there is an anti-hedonistic attitude).
311. See, e.g., supra note 307. Cf KERSTING, supra note 287, at 334 passim.
312. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, DER KAMPF UMS RECHT 20-46 (23d ed. 1946).
313. Id. at 18.
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but rather a violation of the concept of law as such.314 Only in a sec-
ond step, he explained the deterrence effects of a social norm which
established a duty to sanction misbehavior.315 Altogether, there was a
clear anti-utilitarian attitude which did not exclusively come from
German idealism.316 It is one reason for the general dismissal of law
and economics.
C Legal Realism as a Missing Link?
American legal realism was an important antecedent for law and
economics and for its successful reception in legal thought. It discred-
ited prevailing dogmas and so created space for new developments.
Its critique of legal methods sparked a demand for new criteria for
decision-making. On the normative side, judges were called upon to
think about policy more openly; on the positivist side, lawyers needed
to find better tools for predicting the consequences of the law. There
was a similar movement in German-speaking Europe, collectively the
free-law school, which, however, was not as successful as legal real-
ism. The free-law movement managed to temporarily undermine the
prevailing formalism to some degree,317 but it eventually received a
deadly blow by the Nazi regime. As Interessenjurisprudenz (interest-
oriented jurisprudence) assumed the legacy of classical formalism, in-
terdisciplinary research was put to an end. Heck, one of the best
known proponents of this school, explicitly emphasized a purely in-
ternal view of the law.318
314. Id. at 40.
315. JHERING, supra note 312, at 46passim.
316. Anton HUgh & Byung-Chul Han, Utilitarismus, in 11 HISTORISCHES
WORTERBUCH DER PHILOSOPHIE 506 (2001).
317. LARENZ, supra note 24, at 19 passim. Cf Kaufmann, supra note 261, at 121
(arguing that the free-law movement was primarily directed against the conceptual
jurisprudence). For an attack on conceptualism, see, e.g., Eugen Ehrlich, Uber
Lacken im Rechte, JURISTISCHE BLATTER 447 (1888); EUGEN EHRLICH, FREIE
RECHTSFINDUNG UND FRETE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1903); Eugen Ehrlich, Die rich-
terliche Rechtsfindung auf Grund des Rechtssatzes, 67 JHERINGS JAHRBOCHER FOR
DE DOGMATIK DES BORGERLICHEN RECHTS 1917, 1-80, reprinted in MANFRED
REHBINDER, EUGEN EHRLICH: RECHT UND LEBEN (1967). Cf Herget & Wallace,
supra note 85.
318. PHILIPP HECK, BEGRIFFSBILDUNG UND INTERESSENJURISPRUDENz 27 (1932)
(arguing that the Interessenjurisprudenz was based on merely legal foundations). CL
HERGET, supra note 1, at 111 (arguing that the "scholastic tradition persisted, but in a
new form"); Alexander Somek, From Kennedy to Balkin: Introducing Critical Legal
Studies from a Continental Perspective, 42 KAN. L. REv. 759, 763 (1994) (arguing
that "every attack on legal formality seems to have been silenced"); accord. Somek,
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The end of classical formalism was a consequence of the empha-
sis on the social function of the law. Many understood law as a means
to regulate and steer human behavior and not as an end in itself.19
The free-law movement might have discredited classical legal thought
altogether but it managed to do so only with respect to the most ex-
treme types of formalism. The movement slowly began to develop
towards the end of the 19th century, as a critique on the theory of la-
cunae 320 and reached its peak in the years preceding World War 1.321
At the same time, the closely connected law and sociology move-
ment322 criticized the dominant understanding of the law. The free-
law movement emerged from a discussion group of a small number of
people around Kantorowicz and Radbruch in 1903 and 1904.323 Its
name can be traced to a speech given by Eugene Ehrlich in 1903. 4 In
1906, Kantorowicz published his influential book Der Kampf urn die
Rechtswissenschaft (The Struggle for Legal Science) which was an
outright attack on classical legal thought.325 Similarly to American
Legal Realism, members of the free-law movement understood judi-
cial opinions as discretionary acts, which were only justified by a cha-
supra note 293, at 348.
319. In particular, Jhering's Law as a Means to an End (1877-83) had an immense
influence on the legal discourse. 1 RUDOLPH VON JHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT
250 (3d ed. 1893) argued, e.g., that the law was "not the most sublime in the world
and had no end in itself" but the law "was a means to an end, final purpose of which
was the existence of a society." Cf Winkler, supra note 24, at 262, 276-77. Regarding
Marx, see WAGE, supra note 278, at 47 passim.
320. See, e.g., Ehrlich, Lucken, supra note 317, at 447-630 (arguing that, due to
the deeply enrooted approach to law, changes in the law were only possible by means
of the "good faith" clause; id. at 112. See also OSKAR BOLOW, GESETZ UND
RICHTERAMT (1885). Regarding the free-law critique on the presumed determinacy
of the law, see DAWSON, supra note 62, at 442-43; see generally LUIGI LOMBARDI,
GESCHICHTE DES FREIRECHTS 54 (1967).
321. MARTIN KRIELE, GRUNDPROBLEME DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 43, n.4 (2003)
(arguing that the main works of the free-law school were written between 1906 and
1915).
322. MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT (5th ed. 1976); EUGEN
EHRLICH, GRUNDLEGUNG DER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS (1913).
323. The participants surrounding Kantorowicz and Radbruch discussed writings
by Ehrlich, Savigny and others; see Muscheler, Einfohrung, in HERMANN
KANTOROWICZ (GNAEUS FLAViUs), DER KAMPF UM DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT VIII
(Nomos: 2002 (reprint)). C£, comprehensively discussing Kantorowicz, KARLHEINZ
MUSCHELER, HERMANN ULRICH KANTOROWICZ: EINE BIOGRAPHIE (1984). The
name Freirecht (free-law) goes back to EUGEN EHRLICH, FREIE RECHTSFINDUNG
UND FREIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (Leipzig, 1903).
324. See EHRLICH, id
325. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 243, Foreword
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rade of legal methods after the actual decision had been taken.326
Analogies and justifications for extensive and restrictive modes of in-
terpretation were considered to be pseudo-logic arguments.327 Her-
meneutics played a major role in that the prejudices of the judge were
considered to be decisive for legal intuition and thus for the outcome
of the case. 328 Free-law scholars argued that an objective interpreta-
tion, assuming that legal norms could have a unique meaning, was an
impossibility. In Ehrlich's words: "The one who speaks always wants
to say something different from what the one who listens under-
stands., 329  Others such as Kantorowicz likewise attacked dogmas
such as objectivism and predictability of the case law.33  Kan-
torowicz's primary goal was to explain the extent of freedom judges
already had33' and not, contrary to some of his critics,332 to facilitate
arbitrary jurisprudence. 33 From these insights, free-law scholars such
as Fuchs derived a fact-base approach to the law.33 ' Moreover, they
encouraged lawyers to engage in interdisciplinary work.335
326. KRIELE, supra note 321, at 43. A good example of this critique is HERMANN
ISAY, RECHTSNORM UND ENTSCHEIDUNG 61-62 (1929).
327. Muscheler, Einfuhrung, supra note 323, at XVII (about Kantorowicz).
KANTOROWICZ, supra note 243, 35 himself used the expression "dishonest shortcuts."
See also HERGET, supra note 1, at 111; Somek, supra note 293, at 348.
328. Cf Kaufmann, supra note 261, at 122.
329. Ehrlich, Rechtsfindung supra note 317, at 207 (criticizing objectivity in the
law). BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, at 69 passim is a good example of how hermeneutics
have influenced contemporary legal methods.
330. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 243, at 36-37. See also Ernst Fuchs, Freirechtss-
chule und Wortstreitgeist, MONATSSCHRIFT FOR HANDELSRECHT UND BANKWESEN
17 (1918), reprinted in FOULKES, supra note 261 (criticizing legal dogma); cf Kauf-
mann, supra note 261, at 121.
331. KANTOROWlCZ, supra note 243, at 35.
332. See, e.g., HECK, supra note 318, at 116 passinm, see also PHILIPP HECK, DAS
PROBLEM DER RECHTSGEWINNUNG 23-24 (2d ed. 1932) (1912).
333. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 243, at 34. Still this critique was put fourth sev-
eral times after Kantorowicz's clarification, see especially HECK, BEGRIFFSBILDUNG,
supra note 318, at 105, 111; HECK, supra note 332, at 22 passim.
334. Fuchs, supra note 261, at 7.
335. See, e.g., KANTOROWICZ, supra note 243, at 38; Fuchs, supra note 261, at 7;
KARL G. WURZEL, RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT ALS SOZIALWISSENSCHAFr: JURISTISCHES
DENKEN UND SOZIALDYNAMIK DES RECHTS 5-6, 70 (photo. reprint 1991) (1904);
KARL G. WURZEL, DIE SOZIALDYNAMIK DES RECHTS 182 (photo. reprint 1991)
(1924). See also Miller-Erzbach, supra note 287, at 107 (arguing that German corpo-
rate law did not account for the economic implications of dispersed ownership in
publicly held corporations, and referring to the failure of the general meeting as a
corporate decision-maker body.
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Prior to World War II, the free law school was not only accepted
among academics,336 but also widely recognized by judges, including a
Chief Justice of the Austrian Supreme Court.337 Some even under-
stood, contrary to a long tradition, that judicial decisions had the
same legal power and validity as a statute. 338
Today, free-law notions appear infrequently in recognized text-
books of legal history, legal outlines of law and philosophy, 9 and le-
gal textbooks on methodology.340 The decline and eventual fall of the
movement was partly due to a misunderstanding of the main proposi-
tions. '4 ' More importantly, free-law scholars, such as Kantorowicz,
were professionally pretermitted. In spite of these obstacles, the
movement might still have persisted if the Nazis had not come to
power. Due to the Jewish heritage of some of the free-law school ad-
herents,3 2 it was often subject to derision.343 As a result of the Nazi
regime, many free-law scholars were immediately suspended from
their posts, which led to a rapid decline of the movement.344 Other
336. A very well-known free-law work of the 1920s includes ISAY, supra note 326.
337. See ISAY, supra note 326, at 62 passim for citations of the mentioned lawyers.
See also NORR, supra note 249, at 30 (with reference to decisions). See generally the
decision of the former German Federal Court of Justice, Reichsgericht, June 27,
1922, 104 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 397 (German
Reich) (explaining the inventive role of judges).
338. NORR, supra note 249, at 30 passim. Cf DAWSON, supra note 62, at 432-63
(arguing that in the 1920s courts increasingly cited precedents as a results of the
"case-law revolution").
339. WIEACKER, supra note 62; VERDROSS, supra note 308; Kaufmann, supra note
261, at 1 passim.
340. BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, with few sporadical references; PAWLOWSKI, supra
note 19, at n.137 with a short reference to Isay. See also LARENZ, supra note 24, at
59-62 (with a discussion of the free-law school); however, this part is missing in the
student's edition: KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE - STUDIENAUSGABE (2d ed.
1992).
341. Rehbinder, Vorwort, supra note 317; Muscheler, Einfu'hrung, supra note 323,
at XIII-IX. BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, at 152.
342. See LOMBARDI, supra note 320, at 41 (briefly analysing the ancestry of some
free-law proponents). See also NORR, supra note 249, at 31.
343. See, e.g., Philipp Heck, Die Interessenjurisprudenz und ihre neuen Gegner,
in 22 ARCHly FOR CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 129, 129-51 (1936) (arguing that various pro-
ponents of the free-law school and the sociological jurisprudence were "non-aryan."
See also Foulkes, Vorwort in FOULKES, supra note 261, at 9 (discussiong the roles of
Heck and Thiema).
344. Muscheler, Einfuhrung, supra note 323, at XXII; Foulkes, Vorwort in
FOULKES, supra note 261, at 9. Contra Behrends, Von der Freirechtsbewegung zum
Ordnungs- und Gestaltungsdenken in RALF DREIER & WOLFGANG SELLERT, RECHT
UND JUSTIZ IM "DRITTEN REICH" 34 passim (1989) (arguing that the free-law move-
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than in the United States there was no time for the school to develop
until World War II. The fact that legal methods are often said to
show some continuity prior and posterior to World War I14 does not
mean that the Nazi regime did not have any influence. On the con-
trary, it prevented a change in legal thought that developed else-
where, and especially in the United States.346
After World War II, free-law scholars such as Radbruch3"7 and
Esser 8 were quite successful in the academic debate3 49 but were un-
able to deploy any serious influence on the daily practice of law.350
Even though the free-law school did much to discredit formalism, the
legacy of classical legal thought was taken up by the school of Interes-
senjurisprudenz.351 Interessenjurisprudenz after all was a school that
used hermeneutics and other insights to advance classical legal
thought and not to replace it with an entirely different approach.352
Some free-law scholars mitigated their own views which partly led to
a convergence of the two schools.353
ment met the legal theory of the Nazi-regime). Kantorowicz was suspended on April
13, 1933; see Jbrn Eckert, Was war die Kieler Schule?, in FRANZ JORGEN SACKER,
RECHT UND RECHTSLEHRE IM NATIONALSOZIALISMUS 44 (Franz Juirgen Sacker ed.,
1992).
345. Ingeborg Maus, Juristische Methodik and Justizfunktion im Nationalsozial-
ismus, in HUBERT ROTTLEUTHNER, RECHT, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE UND
NATIONALSOZIALISMUS, 18 ARSP-BEIHEFr 167, 193 (1983); Ingeborg Maus, "Geset-
zesbindung' der Justiz und Struktur der Nationalisozialistischen Rechtsnormen, in
DREIER & SELLERT, supra note 344, at 81.
346. For a discussion on whether the Nazi's legal theory was based on positivism
or natural law see Kaufmann, Rechtsphilosophie und Nationalsozialismus in
ROTTLEUTHNER, supra note 345, at 1.
347. GUSTAV RADBRUCH, EINFUHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFr 161 (9th
ed. 1952) (arguing that the methods of interpretation are chosen after the decision
has been made).
348. ESSER, supra note 33, at 7-8 (arguing that the courts do not apply doctrinal
legal methods but that they simply use them for justifying their decision legal artis);
cf id., at 14-15, 23-24, 41-42.
349. See, e.g., LARENZ, supra note 307, at 24. See also PAWLOWSKI, supra note
19, at n.757 passim with reference to Esser, Harenburg and others.
350. Kaufmann, supra note 261, at 82-83; see also infra Section 0.
351. HERGET, supra note 1, at 111; infra note 318. See above all Heck's critique
on the free-law school: HECK, supra note 318, at 104 passir, HECK, supra note 332, at
23 passir, Heck, supra note 343, at 129.
352. ESSER, supra note 33, at 116.
353. HECK, supra note 318, at 105-06 with reference to Ehrlich; HECK, supra note
332, at 25-26 with reference to Kantorowicz (arguing that the term "free-law method"
should be dropped). Cf Muscheler, Einfuhrung, supra note 323, at XVII; Karlheinz
Muscheler, Ein Klassiker der Jurisprudenz: "Der Kampf urn die Rechtswissenschaff"
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The fall of the free-law school was an important factor for to-
day's aversion against law and economics.354 If classical legal thought
had been discredited and free-law views concerning the indetermi-
nacy of the law had become widely accepted, a demand for external
criteria to evaluate legal propositions would likely have developed.
D. Reproduction in "Interessenjurisprudenz" and
"Wertungsjurisprudenz"
The school of Interessenjurisprudenz and its successor Wertungs-
jurisprudenz form today's basis for legal methods."' Both approaches
make references to policy and legislation as an inferior part of legal
science, and exclude external criteria, including economic efficiency.
Other than the free-law school, which disengaged the unques-
tioned trust in statutes, the Interessenjurisprudenz restored the
"faithfulness" in statutes and legal documents in general. This rees-
tablishment included the disuse of external criteria, and was a way of
pretending that lawyers were impartial-precisely because they were
only interpreting a given norm. Heck explained that Interessenjuris-
prudenz distinguished itself from the free-law school exactly in its
confidence in statutory law.356 For him, the appropriateness of a norm
was often much less important than the coherence with the legal sys-
tem.357 The younger school of Wertungsjurisprudenz had a very simi-
lar approach in that all value judgments had to be found in statutory
law. Not surprisingly, legal theorists often find it difficult to distin-
guish between the two.35 It was justified on the premise that legal
certainty was more important than justice.359
The battle over the heritage of Begriffsjurisprudenz resulted in a
von Hermann Kantorowicz, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 567 (2006); see also
LOMBARDI, supra note 320 (discussing the free-law school and the Interessenjuris-
prudenzas one movement).
354. Cf Somek, Kennedy, supra note 318, at 763-64 (making the same argument
regarding the aversion of Critical Legal Studies).
355. LARENZ, supra note 24, at 120; BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, at 116-17, 123.
356. HECK, supra note 318, at 111, 118; Heck, supra note 343, at 144. See also
Julius Binder, Bemerkungen zum Methodenstreite in der Privatrechtswissenschaft,
100 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAF-rSRECHT 82
(1934).
357. HECK, supra note 318, at 105; HECK, supra note 332, at 5.
358. Grimm, supra note 42, at 469 passir, cf BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, at 123,
126.
359. KRIELE, supra note 321, at 44.
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general acceptance of social norms as part of legal methods - but only
if they were mentioned in legislative documents.36 Interessenjuris-
prudenz assumed that legislators sought to solve conflicts between
different human interests. Thus, any relevant conflict would be re-
ferred to in the official explanatory documents accompanying legisla-
tion, that is, it had to be somehow derived from and recognized by the
legislative process. Contrary to Begriffsjurisprudenz, it displaced
conceptual abstractions with conflicts of interest. However, general
policy arguments and moral views by the judges were not allowed to
be officially mentioned in judicial reasoning.361 Judges were said to be
bound by the "legislators' views," instead of their own intuition. 2
Scholarship should support judicial decision-making by organizing le-
gal materials and filling in lacunae in the legal system. 3
With this internal view of the law, Interessenjurisprudenz was
unable to develop a theory of policy and legislation. Heck described
the "finding of norms" recursively: The law as it should be is part of
interpretation and thus the law as it is." According to Heck, solely
legal tools were permitted in interpretation, which should be totally
independent from external moral views.365 Clearly, Interessenjuris-
prudenz promoted a constructivist, internal view of the law, much like
191h century Begriffsjurisprudenz, and left little space for interdiscipli-
nary studies.
Part of this approach was the immense emphasis placed on co-
herence. Heck thought that the interpreter should always take into
account the entirety of the statutes when reading legal norms.366 Any
gap had to be filled from within the legal system in strict faith to the
statutes;16' any external criteria that indicated a different interpreta-
tion or proposed a different reading, arguably a more appropriate
one, had to be excluded. It is not surprising that other social sciences
such as history, philosophy, sociology and economics were explicitly
excluded from legal inquiry. This anti-interdisciplinary view pre-
360. BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, at 114.
361. Cf BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, at 115.
362. HECK, supra note 332, at 8.
363. HECK, supra note 318, at 126.
364. Id. at 127-28.
365. Id. at 28-29.
366. Id at 107.
367. See, e.g., id. at 111. Cf HERGET, supra note 1, at 115-16.
368. HECK, BEGRIFFSBILDUNG, supra note 318, at 21.
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vails even today.369
Today's Wertungsjurisprudenz picked up the internal view of the
law from Interessenjurisprudenz, but argued that a "subjective"
(originalist) interpretation should be replaced by an "objective" in-
terpretation, that is an interpretation which focuses on the "values"
embodied in legislative acts.7 Proponents of Wertungsjurisprudenz
argue that it is possible to offer a method of interpretation that yields
clear and objective results where legislative intent is not made clear,
and thus to repel value judgments by the courts . 7 ' According to Wer-
tungsjurisprudenz, values have to be found within the relevant stat-
utes and not by means of external criteria; for this inquiry it is thought
to be irrelevant that the value judgments in a pluralistic society (and
thus statutory values) are necessarily manifold. 2 Many believe that
legislation serves as a compromise normalizing divergent values.3 73 Of
course, this undertaking is much too optimistic as it is impossible to
determine "objective values" of particular statutes.
Today, few scholars argue that decision-making has to include
external criteria and even if they do, the criteria are not truly exter-
nal. For example, Zippelius argues for taking into account the "legal
ethos of a community" and the "prevailing views of justice" that are
371to be found in the constitution and the entirety of the legal norms.
Most think that external criteria may not be used to interpret the law:
Pawlowski argues that the authority of judgements can only be based
on legal, that is, statutory norms.375 Larenz states that a lawyer has an
advantage over an ethicist because, unlike the ethicist, he is bound by
"the values predetermined by the legal system, the constitution and
369. ALEXANDER SOMEK & NIKOLAUS FORGO, NACHPOSITIVISTISCHES
RECHTSDENKEN. INHALT UND FORM DES POSITIVEN RECHTS (1996) (fiercely attack-
ing contemporary legal education).
370. BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, at 123-24, 127, 131; LARENZ, supra note 24, at 318.
But see HECK, supra note 318, at 96 (mentioning "objective" elements). See also
ALEXANDER SOMEK, RECHTSSYSTEM UND REPUBLIK 193 passim (1992).
371. BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, at 128, 131.
372. ROBERT ALEXY, THEORIE DER JURISTISCHEN ARGUMENTATION 329-30
(1996) (discussing the "exoneration function" of legal methods and the various ways
of internal justifications).
373. Id.
374. See generally REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, WERTUNGSPROBLEME IM SYSTEM DER
GRUNDRECHTE 131 (1962); REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS DAS WESEN DES RECHTS 123
(1965); REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE 12, 21 (1985).
375. PAWLOWSKI, supra note 19, at n. 95.
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the generally accepted legal standards". 76 Bydlinski argues that all
criteria used for decision-making have to be found in the statutes;
otherwise the law as such could not be clearly defined?. This internal
view of the law has influenced the policy discussion by reducing the
set of arguments to systematic ones. Many lawyers nowadays argue
that the law should be coherent when it comes to reforms.78 For the
rest, they argue that the law should be appropriate ("angemessen,"
"sachgerecht") without further specification. These terms have been
used by scholars of both the Interessenjurisprudenz and Wertungs-
jursprudenz."'
E. The End of Legislation and Policy as an Element of Legal
Science
The internal view of the law, promoted by the schools of Interes-
senjurisprudenz and Wertungsjurisprudenz, was more than apparent
in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law through which it has influenced a
broad spectrum of legal theories. Whereas Savigny argued for an ap-
proach under which policy was based on current law, Kelsen wanted
to ban policy altogether from the legal discourse. The political impli-
cations were quite different. During the pre-democratic 19"' century,
an internal view of the law had been used to maintain the current law.
On the contrary, in post-World War I democracies, an internal view
of the law was thought to be progressive because the law would most
closely reflect the will of the people embodied in legislative enact-
ments.3 For our purposes, however, the effect was the same - law
and economics was rejected as a legal discipline.38'
Different from Savigny, Kelsen emphasized the distinction be-
376. LARENZ, supra note 24, at 291; cf LARENZ, supra note 307, at 25.
377. BYDLINSKI, supra note 19, at 128 (arguing that, due to the "need for rational
verification ...the legal standards have to be clearly separated from other stan-
dards").
378. A good example is the reform of a new Austrian commercial code; see the
statements available at <http://www.bmj.gv.at/ download/gesetzes/ stellungnah-
men-hraendg2004.pdf> (visited Oct. 14, 2006).
379. LARENZ, supra note 340, at 6; HECK, supra note 332, at 8. Cf Nikolaus
Forg6 & Alexander Somek, Nachpositivistisches Rechtsdenken, in SONJA BUCKEL,
RALPH CHRISTENSEN & ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO, NEUE THEORIEN DES RECHTS
263, 277 (2006) (arguing against a dogmatic use of legal terms); accord SOMEK &
FORGO, supra note 369.
380. Grimm, supra note 42, at 491-92.
381. See NOLL, supra note 5, however, without reference to law and economics.
[Vol. 31:1
The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought
tween normative theories (the law as is ought to be) and positive
theories (the law as it was). Influenced by logical positivism and the
Vienna Circle of philosophy,38 Kelsen argued that normative theories
were not scientific and thus lacked valid arguments.3 83 Legal science
could only put the legal norms in order and form a coherent system
but had to abstain from questioning the reasonableness of the
norms." Since normative arguments were not verifiable or falsifi-
able, policy was arbitrary."' In his view, any natural law was uto-
pian."'
The purity of Kelsen's theory was precisely the exclusion of other
disciplines.387 This way, a lawyer was thought to be able to make apo-
litical and impartial decisions when interpreting the law or deciding a
case.3" As a relativist, Kelsen had personal moral views, but he de-
nied its general validity or even the possibility of general validity.389 It
is not surprising that Kelsen analyzed a variety of ethical approaches
in his work Was ist Gerechtigkeit? (What is Justice?), including utili-
tarianism, but concluded that all of them are indeterminate.
Whereas Bentham defined the maximization of happiness as the ob-
jective of legislation, Kelsen avoided any guidelines to the law regard-
ing contents.391
For Kelsen, statutory law was the result of a political compro-
mise that interpreters, most importantly judges, ought not to undo by
applying personal value judgments.3'9 Naturally, this precludes an
open policy discussion as part of "legal science. ' , 39' An internal view
of the law was quite welcome by the legal community. First, it gave
382. Kaufmann, supra note 261, at 124.
383. HANS KELSEN, DIE PHILOSOPHISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN DER
NATURRECHTSLEHRE UND DES RECHTSPOSITIvisMus 64, 70 (1928).
384. Id at 67, 71.
385. SKIRBEKK & Gl-E, supra note 266, at 834-35.
386. KELSEN, supra note 15, at 43, 52; KELSEN, supra note 383, at 68.
387. HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 1 (photo. reprint 2000) (1960) (arguing
that psychology, sociology, ethics and political sciences should be excluded from legal
science); see also KELSEN, supra note 15, at 52.
388. KELSEN, supra note 15, at 51-52.
389. See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 15, at 52.
390. See generally, id. (discussing Plato, Aristotel, Kant, Bentham and others).
391. See LEE, supra note 124, at 165, 185. GERALD J. POSTEMA, supra note 122.
392. KELSEN, supra note 383, at 67. Cf Kaufmann, supra note 261, at 125; for a
short summary of the background of legal positivism see KRIELE, supra note 321, at
65-74.
393. Cf Weinberger, supra note 261, at 175.
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the lawyer a competitive advantage over scholars from other disci-
plines in the political decision-making. Secondly, lawyers were able
to reject any responsibility for the legal system as they were seen as
passive and impartial executers of a given statutory law.
This need for impartiality was consolidated after World War II
where lawyers disclaimed responsibility for having interpreted the law
as it was given. Not surprisingly, people argued that legal positivism
had facilitated gross perversions of justice under the Nazi regime."'
Radbruch proposed that statutory law should not be binding where it
stood in clear contradiction to justice.395 The revival of natural law in
the postwar period led to an intermittent revival of an external per-
spective of the law,396 but the movement did not survive. Soon, the
prevailing opinion held that positivism and non-positivism had been
irrelevant for Nazi jurisprudence.397 The main argument was that Nazi
law combined both positivism and non-positivistic approaches: Statu-
tory law passed under the regime had been interpreted in a strictly
positivistic manner; any "pre-revolutionary" law had been interpreted
widely, i.e. reinterpreted in the light of Nazi ideology."' As a result, a
critique of legal positivism can no longer credibly invoke the devel-
394. See, e.g., Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und ubergesetzliches
Recht, in SODDEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG (1946), reprinted in ARTHUR KAUFMANN,
3 GUSTAv RADBRUCH GESAMTAUSGABE 105 (1990); WILHELM R. BEYER,
RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHE BESINNUNG (1947); HELMUT GOING, DIE OBERSTEN
GRUNDSATZE DES RECHTS (1947); HANS WELZEL, NATURRECHT UND MATERIALE
GERECHTIGKEIT (1951); HEINRICH ROMMEN, DIE EWIGE WIEDERKEHR DES
NATURRECHTS (2d ed. 1947); Hermann Weinkauff, Die deutsche Justiz und der Na-
tionalsozialismus Ein Uberblick, in HERMANN WEINKAUFF & ALBRECHT WAGNER,
DIE DEUTSCHE JUSTIZ UND DER NATIONALSOZIALISMUS 17, 28 (1968); Hermann
Weinkauff, Der Naturrechtsgedanke in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs,
in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1689, 1691 (1960). Cf Lon L. Fuller, Positiv-
ism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 657-661
(1958).
395. Radbruch, supra note 394, at 83, 89.
396. Kaufmann, supra note 261, at 81 passin, see generallyHERGET, supra note 1.
397. Kaufmann, supra note 346, at 1 passir, Vivian G. Curran, Fear of Formal-
ism: Indications from the Fascist Period in France and Germany of Judicial Method-
ology's Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT'L. L. J. 101,151, n.235 (2001).
398. BERND ROTHERS, DIE UNBEGRENZTE AUSLEGUNG. ZUM WANDEL DER
PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNG IM NATIONALSOZIALISMUS 148, 176, 239 passim (1968)
(mentioning numerous examples of judicial reinterpretations of private law); Bernd
Ruthers, Recht als Waffe des Unrechts - Juristische Instrumente im Dienst des NS-
Rassenwahns, in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2825, 2832-33 (1988); see also
Kaufmann, supra note 346, at 14-15 (with reference to Carl Schmitt and others).
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opment of Nazi jurisprudence in support.3" The natural law revival
lasted shortly, and many returned to what Kaufmann called "neoposi-
tivism," which in the guise of Wertungsjurisprudenz once again ex-
cluded external criteria from the legal disciplines.'
This evolution of legal thought reflects the fact that many law-
yers argued that their work was merely technical and that their pro-
fession was apolitical 'O This was probably an important factor facili-
tating the reconstruction of the law and the legal professions after
World War II. Critical, interdisciplinary studies would have uncov-
ered the political function of lawyers. It is not surprising, that an eco-
nomic analysis of the law was not accepted in the legal community.
VI. Conclusion
We have explained the divergence of legal thought between the
United States and German-speaking Europe by means of the devel-
opment of classical legal thought, the legal realism critique and the
acceptance or rejection of utilitarianism. German legal thought of the
19'h century was deeply systematic and coherence-based, which left
little space for changes due to external criteria such as economic effi-
ciency. First, it was argued, most prominently by Savigny, that cus-
toms represent the law, both as it is and as it should be. Secondly,
once these customs were put into statutory law, the lawyer's work
could focus on the interpretation of the statutes without further ask-
ing whether the law made sense. This made is possible for many to
distinguish between the policy and mere interpretation where the
lawyer's main work increasingly became the latter. This distinction
was heavily criticized in the United States as well as overseas. In the
United States, legal realism discredited classical legal thought and
opened legal scholarship for external criteria. Legal realism, among
other things, argued that a judicial decision was not determined
merely by precedents and other legal materials but always influenced
but the judge's personal views. Not surprisingly, there was a demand
399. Cf ROTHERS, supra note 398, at 442 passim (arguing that the legal methods
are per se inadequate as a defence against a totalitarian perversion of the law).
400. Kaufmann, supra note 261, at 82-83.
401. ROTHERS, supra note 398, at 56; see also id., at 55 (discussing the role of Ex-
Nazi faculty members in the reconstruction of a democracy).
402. See ROTHERS, supra note 398, at 56 (arguing that there was a repeated rein-
terpretation of great parts of the law due to the changes of political systems in the
20th century).
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for normative standards which law and economics was soon ready to
satisfy. In German-speaking Europe the case was similar at first. The
free-law movement gained widespread acceptance in its critique on
classical conceptualism. Other than in the United States, the move-
ment was cut short by World War II and was not revived in the post-
war period. Prevailing opinion sought to further develop classical le-
gal thought instead of discrediting it and excluded external criteria
from its inquiries.
Kelsen's influential legal theory was even more radical in this re-
spect and declared that policy was to be excluded from legal science
altogether. The essence of this view, which is shared by the dominant
schools of German legal theory, prevails until today and has profound
consequences for the reception of the economic analysis of law.
Throughout history, normative analysis reappeared every once in a
while. However, the German attitude was profoundly anti-utilitarian
and thus hostile to law and economics. Unlike in the case of the
United States, in Germany a deep aversion to utilitarian ethics ema-
nated not only from German Idealism but also from materialistic con-
cerns. As far as policy analysis was done it had to include something
else than law and economics.
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